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ABSTRACT
UNCERTAIN BOOMS AND FRAGILITY
Michael Junho Lee
Bilge Yilmaz
I develop a framework of the build-up and outbreak of financial crises in an asymmetric information setting. In equilibrium, two distinct economic states arise endogenously: normal
times – periods of modest investment, and booms – periods of expansionary investment.
Normal times occur when the intermediary sector realizes moderate investment opportunities. Booms occur when the intermediary sector realizes many investment opportunities,
but also occur when it realizes very few opportunities. As a result, investors face greater
uncertainty in booms. During a boom, subsequent arrival of negative information about
an intermediary asset results in large downward shifts in investors’ confidence about the
underlying quality of long-term assets. A crisis of confidence ensues. Investors collectively
force costly early liquidation of the intermediated assets and move capital to safe assets, in
a flight-to-quality episode.
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
The accumulated history of crises reveals three remarkably predictable stages of a crisis:
(1) the run-up – an investment boom fueled by credit expansion; (2) the trigger – a “small”
negative shock concerning the quality of asset markets; and (3) the outbreak – widespread
capital flight, during which large amounts of investment capital flock from intermediary
assets to safe assets.1 Existing theories of financial fragility and crises commonly view the
build-up and trigger as consequences of external aggregate fluctuations. As a result, the literature predominantly focuses on how the fragile capital structure of financial intermediaries
amplifies and propagates negative real shocks.2 This runs counter to mounting evidence that
the intermediary sector plays a central role in both the build-up and subsequent fragility of
the financial system.3
I develop a model that provides a cohesive framework that weaves together the run-up,
trigger, and outbreak of a financial crisis. The intermediary sector strategically chooses
the quantity of capital to raise from investors and determines the allocation of capital to
long-term investment opportunities in the economy. I show that when the intermediary
sector is better informed about the set of long-term investment opportunities, two distinct
economic states endogenously arise: normal times – periods of modest investment and
financial stability; and booms – periods of expansionary investment that may degenerate
into a financial crisis following negative public information about an intermediary asset.
In the model, the financial intermediary sector has exclusive access to a technology that enables it to identify and assess the quality of long-term investment opportunities. Equipped
with superior information, the intermediary sector can provide profitable intermediation
services to investors, who own capital, but cannot evaluate the quality of the investment opportunities themselves. The intermediary sector chooses the quantity of capital to raise from
1

Calomiris and Gorton (1991) explores the common denominators of financial crises based on historical
data. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008; 2013) highlight the persistence in the occurrence and development of
financial crises.
2
For an overview, see Allen et al. (2009).
3
See Kindleberger and Aliber (2011), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Schularick and Taylor (2012).
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investors, who compete to invest through the intermediary sector. However, as investors
cannot verify the nature of the investment opportunities, they potentially face uncertainty
about the underlying quality of intermediated assets. Consequently, the intermediary sector’s demand for capital acts as an important source of information to investors, who make
their investment decisions based on their beliefs.
Two fundamental forces determine the intermediary sector’s demand for capital – the growth
motive and the risk-taking motive. The growth motive exists purely through the intermediary sector’s access to profitable investments. When financial intermediaries observe a
high level of good investment opportunities, large amounts of capital can be productively
deployed to produce long-term assets. By expanding their operational size, in the form of
leverage, financial intermediaries can allocate capital to productive investment opportunities
and increase profits. On the other hand, the risk-taking motive arises under asymmetric information. When endowed with few productive investment opportunities, the intermediary
sector has a strong incentive to raise large amounts of capital to invest in inefficiently risky
assets, as long as it can obtain funding from uninformed investors. Because intermediaries
can always find a bad investment opportunity to invest in, a moral hazard problem arises.
This moral hazard problem increases as the intermediary sector realizes fewer opportunities.
In equilibrium, two investment states endogenously arise, depending on the nature of the
intermediary sector’s investment opportunities. Normal times occur when the intermediary
sector realizes a moderate level of productive investment opportunities. An intermediary
sector of moderate type does not have strong growth or risk-taking motives, which weakens its incentives to raise larger amounts of capital from investors. By raising a modest
amount of capital, the intermediary sector with moderate investment opportunities focuses
on producing good long-term assets. In turn, investors infer from the modest capital demand that the financial sector realized moderate investment opportunities. As a result, the
intermediary sector avoids an adverse selection cost of capital.
In contrast, booms occur when the intermediary sector realizes either high or low levels

2

of productive investment opportunities. High capital demand is chosen by the intermediary sector of high and low type, for polar reasons. With high investment opportunities,
the intermediary sector is strongly motivated by growth, as more borrowing enables the
intermediary sector to allocate capital to highly profitable investment opportunities. The
intermediary sector finds it optimal to raise large quantities of capital, even if an adverse
selection premium is associated with the cost of capital. In a low realization, the risk-taking
motive dominates. The intermediary sector with few investment opportunities maximizes
profits by producing inefficient assets using funds obtained from investors, who cannot discern whether the intermediary sector has high or low investment opportunities. As a result,
upon observing high capital demand, investors form polarized beliefs, under which the underlying intermediary assets are believed to be either highly productive or inefficiently risky.
Investors face heightened uncertainty in booms. This concentration of uncertainty brings
rise to a development of booms that are fragile to fluctuations in investors’ confidence.
Amidst ex-ante uncertainty, public information plays an integral role in informing investors
about the underlying quality of assets produced by the intermediary sector. As such, in a
boom, subsequent revelation of information can dramatically influence investors’ confidence
about the value of their exposures to the intermediated assets. When investors are provided
with a liquidation option, the intermediary sector becomes fragile to investors’ beliefs, in
the form of liquidity risk.4 In particular, negative information about the quality of an
intermediary asset can depress investors’ confidence about the quality of the intermediated
assets. A crisis of confidence ensues. Investors draw down capital, effectively forcing early
liquidation on intermediaries’ assets, and migrate to safe assets. This explains why banking
crises appear to be triggered by negative news.5
I show that the asymmetric information problem ties together empirical features of financial
crises.6 Prior to a crisis, intermediaries accumulate historically high levels of leverage, or
4

See Diamond (1991; 1993).
See Calomiris and Gorton (1991) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997).
6
Other studies analyze how asymmetric information affects asset securitization (DeMarzo (2005)), precautionary savings (Lucas and McDonald (1992)), fund transparency (Gervais and Strobl (2012)), financing
5
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what is often ex-post described as “excessive leverage.”7 This paper provides an informationbased argument that links high leverage to crises.8 In the model, the borrowing capacity
of the intermediary sector is determined endogenously by investors’ beliefs. As such, the
sustainability of intermediary leverage crucially depends on the stability of investors’ beliefs. I show that investors’ beliefs are especially sensitive to information during periods
of high leverage, due to the propensity for the intermediary sector to take inefficient risks
during high investment periods. As a result, crises necessarily erupt from times of high
intermediary leverage, when negative information about the quality of intermediary assets
shocks investors’ confidence and triggers capital flight. Recent studies also find that banking
crises often grow out of credit booms, or periods of large expansions in credit.9 The model
causally links episodes of expansive credit creation to fragility, consistent with empirical
evidence that shows abnormally high credit creation prior to crises.10
A crisis, presented in this paper, originates from the asset side of the financial sector. Uncertainty endogenously builds up in booms, during which the financial intermediary sector
intermediates large quantities of capital.11 Negative information about the quality of an
intermediary asset precipitates investors’ fears about intermediary insolvency.12 Investors’
lack of confidence manifests into illiquidity, which afflicts the financial intermediary sector,
regardless of whether the underlying assets produced were actually good or bad. Importantly, the fragility of investors’ beliefs in booms stands in striking contrast to the muted
response to negative information in normal times, during which information has little effect
on investors’ beliefs. This is distinct from theories of banking crises that focus on the liability side of the financial sector. Notably, in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), fragility stems
structure (Stein (2005)), debt maturity (Diamond (1991)), and monetary policy transmission (Stein (1998)).
7
Adrian and Shin (2010) documents a sharp increase in banking sector leverage in the recent crisis.
8
Studies have shown how highly levered intermediaries can become vulnerable when adverse economic
shocks affect their net worths, and hence their borrowing capacities. For example, see He and Krishnamurthy
(2012; 2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), and Gertler and Karadi (2011).
9
See Berger and Bouwman (2010).
10
Schularick and Taylor (2012) finds that credit growth strongly predicts crises.
11
Philippon (2015) finds that historically, periods of high financial sector contribution to GDP in the US
are primarily driven by increases in the quantity of intermediated assets. The two peaks correspond to the
two most severe financial crises – the Great Depression and recent financial crisis.
12
See Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988).

4

from coordination failure between investors.13
In the model, financial fragility is an endogenous and inefficient outcome. My view contrasts
with existing theories that argue for the optimality of fragility as a commitment device
(Diamond and Rajan (2001)) or fragility as a side effect of the optimal use of debt (Dang
et al. (2015)). In these theories, fragility is a necessary feature of a functional financial
system. Instead, I view fragility as a detrimental consequence of the strategic interaction
between investors and the intermediary sector resulting from information asymmetry, which
naturally arises from the specialized nature of financial intermediation and a lax regulatory
environment.
These results have important policy implications. Specifically, the discrepancy in the positive view of fragility results in a sharp divergence in the optimal policy. When fragility
is optimal, policy discussions circle around the role of ex-post liquidity provisions to the
intermediary sector or financial markets.14 However, under the view that a financial crisis
begins at the build-up of an investment boom, these policies are not only ineffective, but can
be detrimental. Instead, ex-ante policy, in the form of regulation, is necessary to improve
efficiency. One effective policy I propose is the use of retained earnings as capital buffers.
Inside equity has an ex-ante regulatory effect – the intermediary sector can credibly commit to increasing borrowing only when there are many productive investment opportunities.
This alleviates the asymmetric information problem between investors and the intermediary
sector, and actually improves the allocative efficiency of intermediation.
A broad objective of the paper is to demonstrate a mechanism through which economic
fluctuations originate from the financial intermediary sector. In the model, the intermediary
sector determines both the quantity and the quality of the allocation of capital to investment
opportunities. The strategic incentives for the intermediary sector to provide capital to
the real sector, and its propensity to misallocate capital may directly impact the business
13
14

See also Postlewaite and Vives (1987), Rochet and Vives (2004), and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
For example, see Allen and Gale (1998).
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cycle. I view the intermediary sector as not only amplifying (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Bernanke et al. (1999)) and propagating shocks, as commonly viewed by the literature, but
as an essential segment of the economy that originates fluctuations through its strategic
behavior and interaction with investors.15
This view provides a lens to study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. I
show that monetary policy, through its effect on the risk-free interest rate, can potentially
contribute to fragility.16 In particular, I show that even when the interest rate policy
is perfectly anticipated, it can contribute to financial instability by lowering the relative
cost of adverse selection and increasing investors’ propensity to trigger early liquidation of
intermediary assets.17 Furthermore, I argue that when the underlying cause of fragility is
rooted in asymmetric information between investors and the intermediary sector, stimulative
monetary policy can be highly ineffective in revitalizing the economy. This provides an
explanation for why monetary policy might be ineffective in improving credit conditions
through the banking sector during a financial crisis.
In Chapter 2, I present the model. Chapter 3 contains preliminary results and analysis of
a benchmark case with symmetric information. In Chapter 4, I analyze the main model
with asymmetric information. In Chapter 5, I outline the foundations of a confidence-based
crisis. In Chapter 6, I consider policy implications. In Chapter 7, I conclude.

15

This expands on the view that adverse shocks originating from the financial sector can have real effects,
as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Also, see Borio (2014).
16
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) studies how low real interest rate policies may increase bank leverage and
risk-taking.
17
Allen and Gale (2000) shows how unanticipated shocks to credit policies can have a destabilizing effect.
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CHAPTER 2 : A MODEL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Agents. The model has three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. There are two types of risk-neutral agents,
a measure of competitive investors and one representative intermediary. Investors have deep
pockets and the intermediary has zero wealth. The intermediary is privately informed about
its type θ, which can be high (H), moderate (M ), or low (L) such that:

θ=

where πθ ∈ (0, 1) and

P

θ




H





w.p. πH

M






L

w.p. πM

(2.1)

w.p. πL

πθ = 1.

Assets. The representative intermediary has access to a set of long-term investment opportunities. Long-term assets each cost 1 to produce and pay off after two periods. There
are two types of long-term assets: good assets (i = g), which pay R with certainty, and
bad assets (i = b) , which pay R with probability α ∈ (0, 1). Bad assets are assumed to
be perfectly correlated.1 Good assets have positive returns, while bad assets have negative
expected returns. This is captured by the assumption:

αR < 1 < R.

(2.2)

The representative intermediary’s type determines its set of investment opportunities.2
1

For instance, bad assets may be exposed to systematic risk that is not fully diversifiable. What is
important is that bad assets are partially correlated. High correlation would also be endogenously chosen
by the intermediary if it could produce bad assets with any correlation structure.
2
I offer two broad interpretations of the intermediary’s investment opportunities. One view is that any
marginal asset produced beyond the maximum quantity of good assets Kθ requires overt risk-taking by
the intermediary. The second view is that beyond a certain level of investment Kθ , the intermediary may
face limitations in correctly assessing or mitigating risks. Whatever the underlying reason, the key is that
investors are uninformed about the nature of the intermediary’s opportunities or ability, about which the
intermediary sector is privately informed about. I discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 5.

7

Specifically, an intermediary of type θ has access to Kθ good assets, which is given by:

Kθ =




K





if θ = H

γK






0

if θ = M

(2.3)

if θ = L,

where K > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1). In addition, the intermediary has access to an unbounded
amount of bad assets. Investors cannot verify whether a long-term asset is good or bad,
and can invest in a short-term risk free asset with return 1 that lasts one period.
Intermediation. To produce k assets, the intermediary must raise k capital from investors.
The intermediary of type θ chooses capital demand k(θ) ≥ 0. Upon observing capital
demand k, investors fund the intermediary’s portfolio of assets using a debt contract with
an early liquidation option. The debt contract specifies an interest rate r(k) due at t = 2,
and provides the investor with an option to force early liquidation at t = 1. If the option
is exercised, the entire proceeds from early liquidation is paid to the investor.3 If the
intermediary fails to pay the required payment r(k) per contract at t = 2, the realized
returns of the intermediary’s pool of long-term assets are distributed to existing investors,
proportionally to their initial investments. Investors competitively bid using interest rates
r(k), such that, in equilibrium, investors break even in expectation. As such, while the early
liquidation value is determined by the amount at which the intermediary can liquidate longterm assets, the funding rate r(k) is determined by investors, who competitively bid until
the expected return on debt is equal to the risk free return 1.
After raising k(θ) capital from investors, an intermediary of type θ selects a portfolio k(θ) of
long-term assets that specifies a quantity of good and bad assets, subject to its investment
3

In this setting, investors are contractually entitled to the exact full early liquidation value. This shuts
down problems arising from coordination problems between investors à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
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opportunity set:

k(θ) = (kg (θ), kb (θ)) ∈ {(qg , qb )| qg ∈ [0, Kθ ] and qb + qg = k} ,

(2.4)

where kg (θ) and kb (θ) are the amounts of good and bad assets produced by an intermediary
of type θ.
Public Information and Early Liquidation. At t = 1, a public information signal arrives that
reveals good (G) or bad (B) information regarding the assets produced by the representative
intermediary. The likelihood of good or bad information is endogenously determined by the
composition of the intermediary’s portfolio. Specifically, a noisy signal y arrives about the
quality of a long-term asset that is randomly drawn with equal probabilities, where:

P rob(y = G|i = g) = P rob(y = B|i = b) = ρ,

(2.5)

given an asset of quality i for signal precision ρ ∈ [ 21 , 1). For example, when the intermediary
produces a portfolio of (kg , kb ) assets, the probability that y = G or y = B are given by:

y=




G


B

w.p. ρ ·

kg
k

+ (1 − ρ) ·

w.p. (1 − ρ) ·

kg
k

+ρ·

kb
k

(2.6)

kb
k.

Hence, the likelihood that a bad signal y = B arrives at t = 1 increases when the intermediary produces a portfolio with lower average quality, and likewise, the likelihood that a
good signal y = G arrives at t = 1 increases when the intermediary produces a porfolio of
higher average quality.
After observing the public signal y, investors face an option to force early but costly liquidation. Let an investor’s liquidation decision be denoted l(k, y) ∈ {1, 0}, where l = 1
when an investor decides to exercise early liquidation, and l = 0 if he decides to maintain
investments. If l = 1, an investor receives the full early liquidation value of R per unit of
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risky assets, where R < 1.
Agents’ Objectives. The representative intermediary and investors maximize their expected
payoff at t = 2. Let the total t = 2 cashflow of a θ type intermediary’s portfolio be denoted
R̃(k(θ)). The t = 2 payoff of an investor’s unit debt contract, denoted D2 , is given by:

1
D2 (k(θ), r(k)) = min r(k), R̃(k(θ)) .
k


(2.7)

The expected payoff of the debt contract is the minimum between the promised return on
debt r(k), and the fractional payoff of the intermediary’s portfolio, k1 R̃(k(θ)). Importantly,
the interest rate r(k), which is competitively determined at t = 0, depends on the investors’
equilibrium liquidation strategies, since the decision to liquidate affects investors’ bidding
strategies for the funding rate. Let r0 (k) denote the competitive funding rate given capital
demand k and conditional on the investor’s liquidation decision being l(k, y) = 0 for y =
G, B. The equilibrium interest rate r(k) is equal to r0 (k) if and only if conditional on
the public information signal y for y = G, B, maintaining investments (i.e. l(k, y) = 0)
maximizes the the investor’s conditional expected profits at t = 1. An individual investor’s
liquidation decision l conditional on k and y is chosen to maximize t = 1 expected profits:

max l · R + (1 − l) ·
l∈{0,1}

E [D2 (k(θ), r0 (k))| k, y] .

(2.8)

When the condition for l(k, y) = 0 is violated for any y, an investor chooses l(k, y) = 1
for some y. Note that investors share the same information set at t = 0 and t = 1, and
each investor obtains the full early liquidation value R if they choose to force liquidation,
independent of other investors’ liquidation decisions. As a result, while each investor independently decides on whether to force early liquidation, the liquidation decision is identical
across all investors, conditional on k and y. This directly implies that either all or none of
the intermediary’s assets are liquidated. This setting is intended to abstract from strategic interactions that may arise due to asymmetric information between investors, as in
Chari and Jagannathan (1988), or strategic complementaries that arise due to coordination
10

problems between investors, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
In the model, a liquidation event is a collective decision based on investors’ beliefs and all
available public information at t = 1. The equilibrium interest rate for the debt contract
must also be identical. Given investors’ beliefs, denoted B(k), the equilibrium funding rate
r(k) for capital demand k is determined competitively at t = 0 such that in equilibrium:


E

X





P rob(y = y 0 |k) max E D2 (k(θ), r(k))|k, y 0 , R  = 1.

(2.9)

y 0 ∈{G,B}

As stated earlier, the equilibrium funding rate r(k) is determined conditional on investors’
liquidation strategies. Investors’ bidding strategies reflects the change in the expected
terminal payoff of the debt contract when they anticipate exercising their liquidation option
in some possible future state at t = 1.
A representative intermediary of type θ chooses capital demand k(θ) and portfolio k(θ) that
maximizes its expected profits:

max
k(θ)

X

h
i
P rob(y = y 0 |k(θ)) · (1 − l(k, y 0 )) · E R̃(k(θ)) − k(θ)D2 (k(θ), r(k))

y 0 ∈{G,B}

s.t. k(θ) ≥ 0
kg (θ) ∈ [0, Kθ ]

The intermediary must take into consideration three main aspects that affect its expected
profits. First, the intermediary’s demand for capital k(θ) and portfolio decision k(θ) directly
affect the total surplus from intermediation R̃(k(θ)). Second, the intermediary’s portfolio
decision k(θ) determines the nature of the public information signal y, and in particular,
the likelihood that good or bad information arrives. Third, the intermediary’s demand for
capital k(θ) affects investors’ beliefs, which in turn affect investors’ equilibrium liquidation
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strategies l(k, ·) and the equilibrium funding rate r(k).
Timeline. The events of the model go as follows:
t = 0 The representative intermediary privately learns its type θ, and raises k(θ) capital
from investors, who finance the intermediary through a debt contract with a liquidation option. Given k(θ), the intermediary produces a portfolio k(θ) of long-term
assets;
t = 1 Public information signal y arrives. Investors decide on l ∈ {1, 0}. If investors choose
l = 1, the intermediary is forced to liquidate assets;
t = 2 Existing assets pay out.
I restrict the analysis to pure strategies. The solution concept used is Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. An equilibrium consists of the intermediary’s capital demand k ∗ (θ) and production decision k∗ (θ) for θ ∈ {H, M, L}, and investors’ early liquidation strategies l∗ (k, y),
equilibrium funding rate r∗ (k), and investors’ beliefs B(k). The formal definition can be
found in Appendix A.1.

12

CHAPTER 3 : PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
In this section, I provide some general properties and then analyze the model when investors
are informed about the intermediary’s realization θ. This will serve as a benchmark for the
main framework. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.

3.1. Asset Production and Investment
First, note that investors will fund an intermediary that demands k capital only if given
their beliefs B(k), their participation condition is satisfied:
Condition 1. Given investors’ beliefs B(k), investors’ participation condition for capital
demand k is satisfied if:




E

X

 

P rob(y = y 0 |k) max E D2 (k(θ), R)|k, y 0 , R  ≥ 1.

(3.1)

y 0 ∈{G,B}

Equivalently, investors find it individually rational to participate as long as conditional on
investors’ beliefs B(k), the competitively determined funding rate satisfies r(k) ≤ R. In
other words, an investor provides capital to the intermediary only when given his beliefs,
the expected payoff of the intermediary’s assets are sufficiently great such that investor can
break even. Henceforth, Condition 1 is said to be satisfied if given investors’ equilibrium
beliefs, all equilibrium production choices k ∗ (θ) satisfy investors’ participation condition,
which is necessary for any intermediation to occur in equilibrium.
The intermediary’s portfolio decision has the following general property:
Lemma 1. The intermediary prefers to produce a good asset to a bad asset.
Generally, an intermediary has an incentive to select a good asset over a bad asset conditional on a good asset being accessible. Good and bad assets both cost 1 to produce
and differ only in the likelihood of terminal payoff R. As a result, the intermediary can
always weakly increase its surplus by producing a good asset in place of a bad asset. This
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setting effectively shuts down agency problems sprouting from asset substitution or hidden
effort. Henceforth, I assume that investors’ beliefs about the production decision k(θ) of an
intermediary of type θ reflect the intermediary’s general preference outlined in Lemma 1.1

3.2. Benchmark: Symmetric Information
To contrast with the main setting, I describe the equilibrium outcomes under symmetric
information. Consider when investors cannot directly observe the quality of the long-term
assets, but learn the true realization of the intermediary’s type θ. The symmetric information equilibrium is characterized below:
Proposition 1. Under symmetric information about θ, the first-best outcome is achievable:
the intermediary of type θ raises Kθ capital, and produces a portfolio comprised of Kθ good
assets and no bad assets. Furthermore, investors never exercise early liquidation.
When investors are symmetrically informed about the investment opportunities of the intermediary, investment capital and the number of good investment opportunities of intermediary sector form a positive monotonic relation. When the intermediary realizes more
productive investment opportunities, it is able to obtain, and finds it incentive compatible to obtain, greater amounts of capital from investors. I refer to this as the growth
motive of intermediary investment. An intermediary with more investment opportunities
has an intrinsically greater level of efficient production. The profit-maximizing behavior of
an intermediary motivated by growth coincides with the efficient allocation of capital to
productive long-term investments.
Note that the intermediary does not undertake any inefficient risk-taking in the form of
producing bad assets. Two factors make risk-taking undesirable. First, the seniority of
debt contracts naturally protects investors from inefficient risk-taking at a local level. To
see this, consider an intermediary deciding whether to marginally produce a bad asset by
borrowing more from investors, and suppose that investors provide the marginal funding
1

This rules out equilibria where investors’ beliefs are such that the intermediary will always produce bad
assets and the intermediary is indifferent between a strategy of producing good assets and bad assets.
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with a debt contract with terms that would be offered if they believed all assets to be
funded were good. Due to the seniority of debt, the intermediary, at the benefit of realizing
a greater payoff with probability α when the bad assets pay off, needs to pay investors a
greater portion of the surplus from good assets with probability 1 − α, when the bad assets
do not pay off. As long as the total payoff from the good assets cover the total cost of
funding, investors’ payoffs are unaffected by risk-taking.2 In this way, the intermediary’s
good assets provide “skin-in-the-game.” The intermediary, who must absorb the entire cost
of risk-taking with the payoff from its good assets, is better off producing only good assets.
While a debt contract renders local risk-taking undesirable, an intermediary may increase
its profits by ramping up borrowing and taking sufficiently great risks. However, under
symmetric information, since investors can infer that the intermediary plans to produce
beyond its capacity, investors will demand a higher interest rate that reflects any anticipated
inefficient production of assets.
The growth motive of intermediation captures the positive relation between financial development and economic growth. In times when the set of productive investment opportunities
expands (i.e. higher realization of θ), intermediaries have a natural incentive to facilitate
greater capital allocation. For instance, financial intermediaries may respond to innovations
and opportunities in the real economy and accelerate the capital allocation to long-term
projects.3 Innovations in contracts, market structure, and screening technology can also
expand the intermediary sectors’ efficiency and result in a larger set of feasible investment
opportunities. Real or financial, a positive shock in θ can culminate into greater financial
intermediation and long-term investments that contribute to growth.4
Overall, under symmetric information about the intermediary’s type, the first-best efficient
outcome is obtained. This benchmark will serve to highlight the effect and impact of the
key friction: asymmetric information about the intermediary’s investment opportunities.

2

Hence, the unit payoff of the debt claim is unchanged for local deviations of production.
See Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990).
4
See King and Levine (1993).
3
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CHAPTER 4 : INTERMEDIATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
When the intermediary’s investment opportunities are not directly observable, investors
must base their investment decisions on their beliefs and all available information. As a result, when the financial intermediary sector is better informed about its pool of investment
opportunities, the intermediary demand for capital becomes an important source of information to investors. The intermediary sector’s financing decision incorporates investors’
perception about its underlying investment opportunities.

4.1. Uncertainty in Booms
To isolate the intuition regarding the effect of asymmetric information on the equilibrium
levels of capital investment, I first suppress the t = 1 arrival of public information y by
considering when ρ = 21 . This corresponds to the case where no material public information
about the representative intermediary’s assets arrives until long-term assets mature.
The first main result is that under asymmetric information, greater capital investment is
necessarily accompanied by greater uncertainty. Specifically, two investment states endogenously arise: normal times and booms.1 In normal times, the intermediary sector makes
modest capital investment, and investors face no uncertainty about the underlying investment opportunities. In booms, the intermediary sector makes expansionary capital investment, and investors face high uncertainty about the nature of the investment opportunities.
This dichotomy between normal times and booms results from the equilibrium financing
strategies of each type of the representative intermediary. I show that normal times are
when the intermediary realizes moderate investment opportunities (θ = M ), while booms
arise when the intermediary is either a high or low type (θ = H or θ = L). I call this a
(K1 , K2 ) equilibrium:
Theorem 1 (Uncertain Booms). Let ρ = 21 . There exists an equilibrium in which for some
1
These are “states” in the sense that they are the observable aggregate outcomes, endogenously determined from a latent, unobservable state θ.
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K1 , K2 :
1. an intermediary of type M obtains K1 capital;
2. an intermediary of type H or L obtains K2 capital;
where K2 > KM ≥ K1 > 0 if and only if R > R̂ for threshold R̂ =

πH +πL
πH +πL α .

In addition to the growth motive described in Chapter 3, asymmetric information brings rise
to another economic force that affects intermediary investment: the risk-taking motive.
An intermediary with fewer productive investment opportunities has a stronger incentive
to increase its scale of production, primarily by inefficiently taking greater risks, as long
as it can mask its private information by pooling with a higher type. This moral hazard
problem increases as the intermediary realizes fewer investment opportunities.
The risk-taking motive embodies a deleterious effect of a specialized intermediary sector.
Specialization breeds private information, which creates temptations to profit at the expense
of uninformed investors. Incentives to take inefficient risks are rooted in profit maximizing
behavior – the agency conflict is primarily between insiders and outsiders. In this regard, equity holders, who are positioned to monitor more effectively, may not have strong incentives
to do so.2 This reinforces the sustainability of asymmetric information.
In equilibrium, the intermediary sector raises high amounts of capital K2 when it realizes
high or low investment opportunities, for antithetical reasons. A high type intermediary is
principally motivated by growth. A high type raises large amounts of capital in order to
exploit the abundance of good investment opportunities. This comes at the cost of paying an
adverse selection premium to investors. For a low type intermediary, risk-taking dominates.
A low type maximizes profits by intermediating large quantities of capital, and taking
inefficient risks that are borne by investors, thereby capitalizing on private information.
In contrast, for a moderate type intermediary, neither the growth motive nor risk-taking
2

I discuss the policy implications in Chapter 6.
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Figure 1: Panel 1 and Panel 2 are the expected profits (and profits from deviation) of the high
(black dashed curve), moderate (dark gray dash-dotted curve), and low type ( light gray dotted
curve) for k = K1 and k = K2 , respectively, given investors’ beliefs in a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium with
ρ = 12 . The equilibrium production levels are shown in bold vertical lines, given by K1 = KM and
K2 = KH . The parameters are K = 1, R = 3, α = 41 , πH = πM = πL = 13 , and γ = 12 .

motive are strong enough to warrant high capital demand. Instead, profits are maximized
when it raises modest amounts of capital K1 devoted to producing good long-term assets.
By doing so, a moderate type can convey its private information through its demand for
capital, and avoid an explicit adverse selection cost of capital.
Figure 1 illustrates how the growth and risk-taking motives impact each type of the representative intermediary, and ultimately lead to the (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium structure. Panels 1
and 2 graph the profit curves of each type given the equilibrium (or deviating) strategies for
K1 and K2 , respectively. The bold vertical lines in Panel 1 and 2 represent the equilibrium
investment levels (K1 , K2 ). Accordingly, Panel 1 maps the hypothetical payoff curves of
each type for various values of K1 conditional on investors’ beliefs that θ = M . Note in
Panel 1, the total expected equilibrium profits of the moderate type, shown in dark gray,
increase up to KM , which in this equilibrium also equals to K1 . In comparison, the moderate type’s expected profits from deviating to K2 , shown in Panel 2, are globally inferior
to that achieved at K1 in Panel 1. This is attributable to two factors. First, for k = K2 ,
the adverse selection premium on the cost of capital lowers the intermediary’s share of the
returns from intermediary assets, which can be seen by the dampened slopes of profit curves
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for all types in Panel 2 compared to those in Panel 1. Second, the moderate type’s total
expected profits actually decrease as it produces beyond KM . This is due to the counteraction between the risk-taking and growth motives. A moderate type, by producing bad
assets, actually sacrifices the surplus from good assets in order to finance bad assets. Since
risk-taking entails investing in negative return assets, this diminishes total profits of the
moderate type up to any production level at which the payoff of the good assets cover the
intermediary’s debt obligations. Note, for sufficiently large k, the moderate type’s profit
curve intersects and coincides with the low type’s profit curve, shown in light gray. At
this point, the moderate type’s profit curve begins to increase, as the risk-taking motive
dominates.
The high type’s equilibrium profits in Panel 2, represented in black, are maximized at
KH , which in this equilibrium is equal to K2 . As with the moderate type, any production
greater than KH decreases its payoff. Importantly, even though its profits are reduced due
to the higher cost of capital, they are greater than what it could obtain by deviating to
K1 . The availability of many productive investment opportunities incentivizes the high
type to pursue greater intermediation, even if it must yield a greater share of the surplus to
investors. On the contrary, the low type’s profit curve in Panel 2 exhibits no kink. As the
low type is primarily motivated by risk-taking, profits are determined solely by the level
of intermediation, and not by concerns regarding the quality of its assets. This results in
profits monotonically increasing with respect to k over the entire region of the graph. As
such, while the high type has a strict preference to produce at levels nearest to K, the low
type strictly prefers producing more than K assets.
In a setting of asymmetric information, investment capital and the type of the intermediary form a non-monotonic relation. Furthermore, in a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium, asymmetric
information is partially resolved at the financing stage, but only when demand for capital is
low (k ∗ = K1 ). All residual information asymmetry is concentrated in the high investment
state K2 , bringing rise to uncertain booms. In addition, in an investment boom, investors’
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beliefs are polarized – their beliefs about the intermediary’s type upon observing k ∗ = K2
are:

θ=




H


L

with probability

πH
πH +πL

with probability

πL
πH +πL .

(4.1)

Put differently, investors rationally form beliefs that high investment states are either when
the intermediary sector has many or few investment opportunities. This directly implies
that investors face high uncertainty about the underlying quality of the intermediary’s assets
during booms. In contrast, investors face no uncertainty about asset quality in normal times.
Reconsider the benchmark case described earlier. Under symmetric information, an intermediary of low type was not able to obtain funding from investors; an intermediary of
moderate type raised a moderate level of capital; an intermediary of high type raised a high
level of capital. As a result, the intermediary sector perfectly facilitated the allocation of
capital, and investors faced no ex-ante uncertainty for any equilibrium investment level.
Surprisingly, the existence of a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium when ρ =

1
2

hinges only on equilibrium

investment levels satisfying investors’ individual rationality.3 For K1 , Condition 1 always
holds, since there exists an equilibrium where K1 ≤ γK, and R > 1. For K2 , Condition 1
holds as long as adverse selection is not prohibitively severe:
πH



kg (H)
K2

+ 1{kg (H)<K2 } ·
πH + πL

kb (H)
K2


· α + πL α

R ≥ 1.

(4.2)

A general property of asymmetric information models with signaling is the multiplicity of
equilibria. The (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium is uniquely the only class of equilibria in which any
information is transmitted to investors through the its capital demand that is not trivial in
the following sense:
3

In fact, the (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium structure extends to a wide set of contracts, including short-term debt
and equity.
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Proposition 2. Any informative equilibrium that is not a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium is always
strictly Pareto-dominated by an uninformative equilibrium.
The nonexistence of a nontrivial separating equilibrium is a direct corollary of Proposition
1.4 Since the low type cannot obtain any funding from investors under full separation,
a low type has an incentive to choose a production level that would be chosen by either
a moderate or high type, as long as pooling with a moderate or high type yields profits
greater than zero. Incidentally, the low type can achieve expected profits greater than zero
whenever a high or moderate type can do so, given any production level.5
At glance, the fact that no other nontrivial partial separation can exist is somewhat surprising. A reasonable candidate equilibrium would be one in which the low and moderate
types pool and the high type separates. The key is to understand each type’s incentives to
increase the scale of asset production. For a high type, increasing the scale of investment is
beneficial to maximize its asset production capacity to the efficient level. On the contrary,
a low type has strong incentives to take excessive risk – increasing scale is purely to take
advantage of its private information. As such, the low type has a stronger bias toward increasing scale than either the moderate or the high type. The candidate equilibrium would
require there exist a set of production choices for which the low type prefers to pool with
the moderate type. This would only be the case if the moderate type’s pool entailed higher
production levels. However, a high type has a stronger bias toward higher production due
to its greater efficient capacity. This prevents the existence of such a case.
To understand the equilibrium relation between the pair (K1 , K2 ) to model primitives, I
characterize the constrained efficient (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium:
Proposition 3. Let ρ =

1
2

and R > R̂. The constrained efficient (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium is:

4
There is a knife-edge case where the high type intermediary produces sufficiently many bad assets such
that r(k(H)) = R. This ensures that the intermediary never makes positive profits. Only in this case is
the intermediary of low type indifferent between producing no assets and some assets. This extreme case is
strictly dominated by an uninformative equilibrium, where all types choose to produce  assets, for arbitrarily
small .
5
More generally, fully separating equilibria are always strictly-dominated for sufficiently small KL .
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1. (γ̂K, K) if γ > γ̂;
2. (γK, K) if γ ∈ (αγ̂, γ̂);
3.



γ
γK, αγ̂
K



for threshold γ̂ =

if γ < αγ̂;
πH +πL
H +πL α

R− π

R−1

.

In general, all efficient (K1 , K2 ) equilibria are characterized by the following properties:

K1 ≤ γK
γK < K2 ≤ K

(4.3)
(4.4)

This reveals that relative to the first-best outcome outlined in Proposition 1, underproduction can occur, whether it is in normal times, when K1 < KM , or in booms, when
K2 < KH . At the same time, overproduction is always committed by the intermediary
with low investment opportunities. Asymmetric information results in a dual inefficiency
problem, in which efficiency losses result from both under- and overproduction.
The nature of underproduction depends on the severity of adverse selection, as observed
through γ̂. When adverse selection is high, for example, due to a high likelihood of a
low type relative to high type πL /πH , a moderate type must produce less than KM in
equilibrium. While a moderate type intermediary does not incur an explicit adverse selection
cost of funding, it does incur an implicit adverse selection cost required to credibly signal
to investors its private information. When adverse selection is low, the diminished cost of
risk-taking to the moderate type creates a temptation to overproduce. In this case, the high
type underproduces.
In equilibrium, normal times and booms exhibit a dramatic difference in uncertainty. This
uncertainty is reflected in the discrepancy in expected returns and variance in the payoff
of intermediary assets between normal times and booms. Risk-taking incentives of the
intermediary sector naturally lower the expected value of intermediary assets during booms
22

(i.e.

E[ K11 R̃(K1 )] > E[ K12 R̃(K2 )]), and also contribute to greater variance in the payoff of

intermediary assets (i.e. V AR[ K11 R̃(K1 )] < V AR[ K12 R̃(K2 )]).

4.2. Fragility in Booms
In this section, I analyze the main setting in which after investors fund the intermediary’s assets at t = 0, an informative signal about an intermediary’s asset arrives, which
corresponds to when ρ > 12 .
4.2.1. The Fragility of Investors’ Beliefs and Costly Early Liquidation
Subsequent arrivals of information can play a vital role in shaping investors’ confidence
about their investments made at t = 0.

In particular, investors’ beliefs about the payoff

likelihood of the debt claim may change following the arrival of public signal y at t = 1. A
useful variable is the “investment recovery rate,” or the expected fraction of the promised
return that an investor can retrieve at t = 2, conditional on investors always maintaining
investments, i.e. when l(k, y) = 0 for y = G, B:
Definition 1. The investment recovery rate ω(k(θ)) is given by:

ω(k(θ)) =




1


α + (1 − α) ·

if kg (θ) ≥ k(θ) ·
kg (θ)R
k(θ)r0 (k)

if 0 ≤ kg (θ) <

r0 (k)
R

(4.5)

k(θ) r0R(k)

The investment recovery rate ω is equal to 1 when investors’ debt always pays off at t = 2.
When the payoff from the good assets produced by the intermediary do not cover the debt
payments, the investment recovery rate drops below 1. When negative information arrives,
investors may revise downward their beliefs about the soundness of the intermediary’s investments. Specifically, when investors face uncertainty about k(θ), signal y can affect
investors’ beliefs about ω(k(θ)) at t = 1. Importantly, the magnitude of the downward
shift in investors’ beliefs following public information depends on the informational content
that signal y provides, above and beyond what is already known by investors. The extent to
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which investors’ beliefs are fragile depends on the influence that negative information has
on the formation of investors’ beliefs. I formally define a notion of belief fragility:
Definition 2. Given investors’ beliefs B(k) conditional on k, the fragility of beliefs, denoted F (k), is the change in investors’ beliefs about the investment recovery rate following
a negative signal y = B about an intermediary asset, i.e.

F (k) =

E[ω(k(θ))|k]

E[ω(k(θ))|k, y = B]

.

(4.6)

Intuitively, fragility F (·) measures the sensitivity of investors’ beliefs to information shocks,
controlling for investors’ beliefs at the financing stage, i.e. after observing capital demand
k. As such, it captures the extent to which investors’ beliefs about the value of their debt
claims can drop when a negative signal about an intermediary asset arrives.
The fragility of investors’ beliefs is endogenously determined by the intermediary’s equilibrium strategies. Investors form interim beliefs at t = 0 based on the intermediary’s capital
demand k ∗ (θ). The informativeness of the public information signal y that arrives at t = 1
is endogenously determined by the intermediary’s production decision k∗ (θ). Investors’ beliefs become fragile when public information signal y, which compounds information about
the composition of the intermediary’s assets, highly complements investors’ interim beliefs,
which are formed based on the intermediary’s capital demand.
This fragility of investors’ beliefs is closely tied to investors’ decision to trigger early liquidation of the intermediary assets. Recall,the debt contract provides investors with an
option to exercise early liquidation. Investors select l ∈ {1, 0} after observing public signal
y. As shown in Proposition 1, when investors face no uncertainty about the intermediary’s
type θ, they never choose early liquidation. The option to liquidate is only relevant when
asymmetric information remains unresolved after the funding stage.
Suppose that investors provide the intermediary with capital k which satisfies Condition 1
but remain uncertain about the underlying type θ. At t = 1, public information y arrives.
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Since investors are not perfectly informed about the quality of the intermediary’s assets,
investors rationally update their beliefs. Clearly:
Lemma 2. Liquidation never follows good information, i.e. when y = G.
Following good information, investors’ posterior beliefs reflect an upward revision in their
confidence about the quality of the intermediary assets. However, a negative signal y = B
can prompt a downward revision in the perceived value of intermediary sector’s assets.
This fluctuation in investor confidence results in intermediary’s assets becoming subject to
potential early liquidation. In general, it is optimal to exercise the liquidation option when
beliefs are sufficiently fragile:
Lemma 3. For sufficiently large belief fragility F (k), investors trigger early liquidation
following a negative signal, i.e.
l(k, B) = 1 if and only if F (k)−1 < R

(4.7)

In other words, only when investors’ beliefs are sufficiently fragile (i.e. large F (k)), do
investors exercise their option to force liquidation. In the context of the model, a collective
liquidation event results from sufficiently large drops in investors’ confidence about the
quality of intermediary assets. This resembles a flight-to-quality episode, which refers to
the phenomena where investors abruptly move their capital from certain financial markets
to safe assets due to concerns about the quality of assets.
The structure of the (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium foreshadows when the intermediary sector becomes vulnerable to fluctuations in investors’ beliefs. Investors face uncertainty about the
underlying quality of the intermediary assets exclusively in booms (k ∗ = K2 ). This directly
implies that investors’ beliefs are fragile only in booms, i.e.

F (K2 ) > F (K1 ) = 0.
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(4.8)

4.2.2. Liquidity Risk in the Intermediary Sector
Consider when investors’ beliefs are sufficiently fragile such that the condition specified in
Lemma 3 holds for some investment level k 0 . When the aggregate production level is k 0 ,
a bad signal (i.e. y = B) about an intermediary asset triggers investors to force early
liquidation. Since liquidation is conditioned on the production level k 0 and the arrival of
negative public signal, an intermediary of any type is subject to liquidity risk. Consequently,
the likelihood of early liquidation is taken into account by the intermediary when deciding
on the level of production. In other words, the intermediary anticipates liquidity risk, which
manifests from the mismatch between funding maturity and asset maturity.
The likelihood of a liquidation event, which occurs when negative information arrives, is
endogenously determined by the quality of the intermediary’s portfolio. The probability of
negative information arriving for an intermediary with portfolio (kg0 , kb0 ), where kg0 + kb0 = k 0 ,
is given by:
kg0
kb0
(1
−
ρ)
+
ρ.
k0
k0

(4.9)

Producing bad assets increases the likelihood of bad information arriving at t = 1, which
directly increases the risk of early liquidation. Furthermore, when the intermediary’s investment opportunity set is restrictive such that k 0 > Kθ , the intermediary’s type reflects
the liquidity risk associated with producing k 0 assets.
As a result, liquidity risk is greatest for a low type intermediary who cannot produce any
good assets and is subject to a higher probability of bad information breaking out. The
nature of this risk is detailed in Diamond (1991), who outlines how short-term maturity
might be selected by risky firms even though it poses greater risk of liquidation. Here, the
intermediary faces a tradeoff between choosing greater production that may carry liquidity
risk, or lowering operational scale and avoiding liquidity risk.
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4.2.3. A Crisis of Confidence
While liquidity risk dampens the gains from risk-taking, it does not generally thwart the
production of bad assets. The (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium identified in Theorem 1 extends to
the main setting. Importantly, investors trigger early liquidation exclusively in booms for
sufficiently fragile investors’ beliefs. I refer to a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium in which liquidation
occurs on the equilibrium path as a fragile (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium:
Theorem 2 (Crisis of Confidence). Suppose ρ ≤ max{ρ̌, ρ̂} and R > R̂ for thresholds ρ̌, ρ̂,
and R̂. There exists a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium in which for some K1 , K2 :
1. an intermediary of type M obtains K1 capital;
2. an intermediary of type H or L obtains K2 capital;
where K2 > K1 > 0. Furthermore, if ρ̌ < ρ̂. then, for any ρ ∈ (ρ̌, ρ̂),
1. when k ∗ = K2 , investors exercise early liquidation following y = B;
2. when k ∗ = K1 , investors never exercise early liquidation.
Intuitively, the existence of a fragile (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium depends on two broad aspects.
First, investors’ beliefs must be sufficiently fragile such that in equilibrium, investors find it
privately optimal to force early liquidation. As the fragility of investors’ beliefs monotonically increases in ρ, when ρ > ρ̌ for some threshold ρ̌, investors trigger liquidation following
negative information in booms. In parallel, the interim signal must still be noisy enough
that the low type finds it profitable to undertake the risk of liquidation (ρ < ρ̂). When the
separating mechanism between the moderate type and the low and high type described in
Section 4.1 dominates the intermediary sector’s concerns about liquidity risk, there exists
a set of intermediate values of ρ such that in equilibrium, investors trigger early liquidation
in booms. This corresponds to when the moderate type is “moderate” (γ  1), or when
risk-taking is costly (α small).
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Theorem 2 summarizes the second main result. In a fragile (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium, investors’
beliefs are fragile to public information only in booms, where uncertainty about the quality
of the assets is concentrated. The arrival of negative information about an intermediary
asset leads to an abrupt shift in investors’ confidence about the quality of the intermediary’s
assets. Severe pessimism about the outlook of the intermediary’s assets results in a crisis of
confidence. Endowed with an early liquidation option, investors force liquidation and move
their capital to safe assets.
In a boom, investors form polarized beliefs about the underlying type of the intermediary,
creating conditions particularly conducive to large fluctuations in confidence. Furthermore,
each type produces starkly different portfolios of assets – while a high type predominantly
produces good long-term assets, a low type produces only bad assets. As a result, even
learning about the quality of a single intermediary asset can heavily influence investors’
perception toward all of the intermediary’s assets.
In this way, intermediaries are fragile to a “small” negative information shock during investment booms fueled by debt with a liquidation option. Fragility endogenously arises from
the intermediary sector’s financing and production decisions. Importantly, the liquidation
event is rationally anticipated by the representative intermediary, who takes a calculated
risk, and investors, who are prepared to exit from their exposures to intermediary assets
following the revelation of negative information.
In a fragile (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium, early liquidation is not necessarily ex-post efficient. Investors, who privately determine whether to force early liquidation, do not internalize potential deadweight losses incurred in the process of liquidation. As a result, liquidation can
occur in booms even when the ex-post expected value of intermediary assets is greater than
the liquidation value, i.e. when

R<

1
K2

h

i

E R̃(k(θ), kg (θ)) K2 , y = B .
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(4.10)

This is a consequence of a wedge that can exist between the expected value of the investors’
debt claim at t = 1, and the expected value of the intermediary assets:

E [D2 (k(θ), r0 (k))| k = K2 , y = B] < E




1
R̃(k(θ)) K2 , y = B ,
K2

(4.11)

which holds since r0 (K2 ) < R. When the value of early liquidation is lower than the
perceived value of the underlying assets, Pareto improvements can be made through renegotiation. This is no longer the case when the early liquidation value exceeds the expected
value of intermediary assets. In general, when R > αR, while it is socially optimal to liquidate the assets of a low type intermediary, it is greatly inefficient to liquidate the assets
of a high type intermediary, who by choosing k ∗ = K2 , also risks the possibility of early
liquidation.
4.2.4. The “Calm Before the Storm”
In order to evaluate the effect of liquidity risk on the funding cost r(k), I compare the
outcomes of the fragile (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium to that of a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium without
liquidity risk (i.e. when ρ = 21 ).6
In a fragile (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium, during a boom, investors are prepared to force liquidation
when negative public information arrives. Investors value the option to exit as it curtails
the losses associated with funding a low type intermediary. This flexibility is priced into
the cost of debt. Perfectly competitive investors, endowed with an early liquidation option,
bid down the funding cost more aggressively. For clarity, let this funding rate be denoted
rliq (k). In equilibrium, this has the effect of decreasing the cost of capital relative to the
case without liquidation, denoted rnoliq (k). In other words, prior to the onset of a crisis,
we may observe a lower cost of capital – a “calm before the storm” effect:
Proposition 4. When early liquidation is anticipated in the realization of negative public
information, the ex-ante funding rate drops relative to the rate without early liquidation,
6
Alternatively, the equilibrium without liquidity risk corresponds to the case in which investors finance
the representative intermediary with long-term debt without a liquidation option.
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i.e.

rliq (k) < rnoliq (k)

(4.12)

According to the model, a flight-to-quality episode is preceded by a period of lower-thanusual funding rates. From an econometrician’s standpoint, this investor behavior, which
results from investors rationally taking into account the positive value of the liquidation
option that only arises with incomplete information, would be observationally equivalent
to return-chasing. Not only would it appear ex-post that these investors took on more risk
than desired, since the econometrician observes market-wide early liquidation, but also left
money on the table, since the competitive interest rate appears remarkably lower than what
would be expected from the apparent level of risk intolerance.
4.2.5. The Ex-Ante Cost of Liquidity Risk
The anticipation of liquidity risk can considerably impact the intermediary’s ex-ante equilibrium investment decision in normal times and booms. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the
likelihood of liquidation is highest for a low type. As a result, under the risk of liquidation,
the low type faces a tradeoff between producing many assets and facing liquidity risk. This
can further strain the ability of a moderate type to credibly signal its type. One way to see
this is to compare the ex-ante equilibrium investment levels between an economy in which
liquidity risk arises, to one without liquidity risk.
Figure 2 provides an example that illustrates how liquidity risk may pose an ex-ante cost
on the equilibrium investment decision of the intermediary. To differentiate between the
two cases, let (K1liq , K2liq ) denote the equilibrium production with liquidity risk, and let
(K1noliq , K2noliq ) denote the corresponding equilibrium production without liquidity risk (i.e.
ρ = 12 ). The top two panels present the intermediary profits of each type for k = K1 and
k = K2 , respectively, given investors’ beliefs in a (K1noliq , K2noliq ) equilibrium with liquidity
risk. The bold vertical line on each graph are the equilibrium production levels K1noliq
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Figure 2: The top two graphs plot the expected profits (and profits from deviation) of the high
(black dashed curve), moderate (dark gray dash-dotted curve), and low type (light gray dotted
curve) for k = K1 and k = K2 , respectively, given investors’ beliefs in a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium without
liquidity risk (ρ = 12 ). The bottom two graphs plot the expected profits, given investors’ beliefs in
a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium with liquidity risk (ρ = 8/13). The equilibrium production levels are shown
in bold vertical lines. In both equilibria, K2 = K, but K1liq < K1noliq = γK. The parameters are
K = 1, R = 3, α = 14 , πH = πM = πL = 13 , γ = 12 , and R = 7/8.

and K2noliq . As explained in Section 4.1, the moderate type maximizes profits at K1noliq ,
by producing good assets and avoiding adverse selection costs. The high type maximizes
profits at K2noliq , but pays an adverse selection cost, which is reflected in the slope of its
profit curve. The low type also maximizes profits at K2noliq , primarily by producing bad
assets. In this example, K1noliq = γK and K2noliq = K. In other words, the moderate type
and the high type are both able to invest in all the available good assets.
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The bottom two graphs present the intermediary profits of each type for k = K1 and
k = K2 , respectively, given investors’ beliefs in a (K1liq , K2liq ) equilibrium with liquidity
risk. As with the economy without liquidity risk, the moderate type maximizes profits at
K1liq , and the high and the low type maximize profits at K2liq . However, relative to the
case without liquidity risk, the intermediary profits in a boom are depressed due to the
possibility of forced early liquidation. In particular, the slope of the low type’s profits in
k = K2 is noticeably lower, due to the higher probability of liquidation. As a result, while
K2liq = K = K2noliq , K1liq < γK. Although an intermediary of moderate type avoids an
explicit adverse selection funding cost, it incurs an implicit adverse selection cost through
the equilibrium underproduction of long-term assets, that was not required absent liquidity
risk.
This shows that in addition to making long-term assets vulnerable to costly liquidation, liquidity risk can potentially exacerbate the discrepancy in investment levels between normal
times and booms. Funding with short-term capital, a prominent feature of the financial intermediary sector, can directly contribute to greater inefficiencies in the allocation of capital
by the intermediary sector. This is reveals an additional potential hazard, when liquidity
risk fails to discipline the financial sector and actually contributes to greater instability.7

7

See Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) for the disciplining effects of short-term
debt.
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CHAPTER 5 : FOUNDATIONS OF A CONFIDENCE-BASED CRISIS
In this section, I discuss the building blocks of a financial crisis guided by the intuition
provided by the model. I categorize them into three main components:

1. Information Asymmetry Between Intermediaries and Investors
The financial sector’s investment opportunity set is a function of many factors. Financial
intermediaries may encounter limitations in acquiring proficient workers (i.e. labor market),
or face difficulty monitoring and correctly aligning the incentives of financial workers (i.e.
governance and structure). Financial intermediaries’ screening technologies may be subject
to limited scalability (i.e. financial technology). The depth of investment opportunities is
also determined by real factors, such as the aggregate growth potential of the economy. In
particular, the birth of a new industry or technology provides an opening for the financial
sector to catalyze economic growth.1
All these factors contribute to the accumulation in intermediaries’ private information,
which naturally arises from specialization and intermediation. While information frictions
typically exist in any agency relation, these asymmetries are further amplified by lax regulation, lack of transparency, and complexity that are characteristic of the financial sector.
Ultimately, inefficiencies exist because financial intermediaries, even when confronted with
limitations to their scale of productive intermediation, must exercise restraint, at the cost of
private profits, to ensure socially beneficial stability. The rational choice results in exposing
the economy to catastrophic risks.

2. Investments Funded with Short-Term Capital
As shown in Section 4.2, fragility arises when investors are endowed with a provision of exit.
When this flexibility is in the form of debt, long-term assets are at risk of forced early liqui1

Opp (2010; 2014) develops a general equilibrium framework to study the propagation and amplification
role of financial intermediaries on real innovations.
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dation. Unfortunately, asymmetrically informed intermediaries are drawn to endogenously
fund assets using short-term liabilities. Firms may use shorter maturity debt financing to
signal quality (Diamond (1991)) or use an open-ended structure to signal ability (Stein
(2005)).
The argument applies to both implicit and explicit collateralized borrowing.2 In essence,
investors primarily care about the solvency of financial intermediaries; sound investments
ensure that this be the case. Debt seniority offers limited state-contingent control rights,
enabling investors to trigger early liquidation whether it is an explicit sell-off (seize and
liquidate) or implicit sell-off (rollover risk). In either case, investors’ actions hinge on their
perception of the value of intermediary assets.

3. Competition for Financial Assets
In the model, rational investors compete to obtain claims on intermediary assets. Frictionless competition results in investors bidding down the return on debt. Consequently, the
financial sector extracts the majority of the expected surplus from intermediation. These
circumstances impact the behavior of both investors and the financial sector. From the
investors’ perspective, competition determines the return on intermediary debt, which enhances the relative value of the early liquidation option. As a result, early liquidation can
be privately optimal to investors and still be ex-post inefficient. From the intermediary’s
perspective, the ability to extract the majority of surplus from intermediation attenuates
the aversion to taking actions subject to adverse selection.
What contributes to investors’ competition for financial assets? In the case of the financial
crisis of 2007-2008, one possible source is global imbalances.3 An influx of foreign capital in
search of dollar-denominated assets can result in greater competition for financial assets to
preserve wealth. Heated competition led to foreign and domestic investors alike exploring
asset classes beyond their expertise. In this way, foreign capital flows can result in capital
2
3

See Gorton and Ordoñez (2014).
Bernanke (2005) discusses the “Global Saving Glut”.
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displacement. Expansionary monetary policy contributes in a similar manner. Treasuries
are unique in that while participants may not be perfectly informed, they are likely symmetrically informed. Low interest rates on risk free assets increase the relative benefits of
investing in areas subject to information asymmetry. The symmetric informational nature
of treasuries also makes them ideal to rebound to when investors become pessimistic. Competition encourages investors to seek exposures in uncharted territories, thereby increasing
the insider-outsider conflict between financial intermediaries and investors.4
The Destabilizing Role of Monetary Policy
To conceptualize the effects of monetary policy, consider the comparative statics with respect to the risk free return. Let monetary policy be a set of short-term risk free interest
rates (Rf,0 , Rf,1 ) effective at the beginning of t = 0, 1 respectively, and suppose that the
interest rate policy is common knowledge and fully anticipated at t = 0. Without loss
of generality, consider a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium in which K2 = K. Investors’ participation
condition is given by:
πH + πL α
R ≥ Rf,0 · Rf,1 .
πH + πL

(5.1)

As before, investors’ individually rational constraints are satisfied only if the expected returns on the pooled assets are (weakly) greater than the long-term risk free return. Holding
all else constant, a decrease in the long-run risk free return Rf,0 ·Rf,1 increases the propensity
for investors to finance the intermediary sector.
While the funding decision predominantly depends on the expected long-term risk free
return, investors’ liquidation decisions depend on the dynamics of the risk free rate at
t = 0, when the intermediary sector finances its assets. To see this, reconsider the investors’
condition to liquidate at t = 1 following y = B:
4

For example, Merrill et al. (2014) shows that demand may also play an important role in the excess
production of asset-backed securities prior to the crisis of 2007.
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R · Rf,1 > E[D2 (k(θ), kg (θ), y)|k, y]
Rf,0 · Rf,1 · (πH + πL ) (1 − ρ)πH + ρπL α
·
πH + πL α
(1 − ρ)πH + ρπL
πH + πL (1 − ρ)πH + ρπL α
R > Rf,0 ·
·
πH + πL α (1 − ρ)πH + ρπL
=

Relative to the main specification, where Rf,t = 1 for t = 0, 1, we see that even if the longterm risk free return is set to Rf,0 · Rf,1 = 1, the dynamics of the interest rate policy affect
investors’ rollover decision. Fixing the long-run interest rate Rf,0 · Rf,1 constant, as Rf,0
decreases, investors have a higher propensity to force early liquidation on the intermediary’s
assets. This follows a simple intuition: the decision to liquidate hinges upon the private
value of early liquidation relative to the ex-ante risk-free compensation, which determines
the competitive rate of return on debt. This suggests that monetary policy can have a
destabilizing role even when interest rates are fully anticipated.5 Formally, I show that:
Proposition 5. Let Rf,t be the return on the risk-free asset at the beginning of t = 0, 1 that
is determined at t = 0. Then:
1. Lower Rf,0 · Rf,1 loosens investors’ participation condition;
2. Holding Rf,0 · Rf,1 constant, lower Rf,0 increases investors’ propensity to force early
liquidation.
To summarize, two nontrivial effects of monetary policy can exist. First, a lower long-term
risk free return (i.e. low Rf,0 · Rf,1 ) decreases the relative cost of adverse selection and
encourages investors to finance the production of long-term assets that they are uninformed
about. Second, even with perfect expectations about the interest rate policy, stimulative
policy (i.e. low Rf,0 ) can have a destabilizing effect by increasing the private value of
liquidation at t = 1 following negative information. By influencing the private incentives
5

It is straightforward to see that an unanticipated monetary shock (i.e. positive shock to Rf,1 ) would
also contribute to the investors’ propensity to trigger early liquidation.
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of investors to fund the intermediary sector and to force early liquidation, monetary policy
can potentially play a substantive role in amplifying the fragility of the system.
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CHAPTER 6 : REGULATING AND MANAGING A CRISIS
In this section, I discuss the policy implications of the model.

6.1. Liquidity Provisions
In the midst of a financial crisis, the central bank or lender of last resort (LLR) must
make timely decisions based on available information. A main issue is whether to provide
extraordinary liquidity to financial intermediaries. Anticipation of liquidity provisions or
asset purchases by the central bank can exacerbate risk taking by the intermediary sector
(Farhi and Tirole (2012)). In the context of the model, even without such policy anticipation, the central bank may face difficulties in discerning the ex-post efficient action.
To elaborate, consider any fragile (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium, and suppose that during a boom
(k ∗ = K2 ), negative information (y = B) arrives about the intermediary assets. This
triggers a crisis, whereby investors force early liquidation of the intermediary assets (l = 1).
Consider the decision of the central bank to provide emergency capital to the intermediary
sector to avoid costly liquidation. This amounts to injecting sufficient capital, such that
investors are insured from risks of non-performing intermediary assets. Policymakers may
face a illiquidity v. insolvency dilemma:
• A liquidation event may occur to either when the intermediary sector realized high
or low investment opportunities, as the underlying asymmetric information problem
plagues both types. Investors do not know whether the assets are insolvent or illiquid,
but liquidation is ex-post profit maximizing.
• When R > αR, a high type intermediary is illiquid; a low type is insolvent.
• The ex-post optimal policy under complete information is to provide liquidity to the
intermediary only if θ = H.1
1
Of course, for reasons beyond the scope of the model, bailouts may be ex-post efficient, even in an
insolvency crisis.
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• Given all available public information, the central bank can not discern the underlying
type of the intermediary.
The optimal policy, which coincides with classical bailout policies advocated by Thornton
(1802) and Bagehot (1888), is difficult to implement unless the central bank is capable of
assessing the true quality of intermediary assets.2 This makes ever more relevant the importance for regulators to be informed about the underlying financial assets and be equipped to
make impartial judgments on the solvency of financial institutions. Intermingling between
regulators and the financial sector, and the constant need for regulators to keep up, presents
a clear challenge.3

6.2. The Efficacy of Monetary Policy
In an effort to stabilize financial markets and to stimulate the economy, central banks
use monetary intervention. I discuss the effectiveness of the liquidity channel of monetary
transmission.4
In Chapter 5, I discussed how easy monetary policy can amplify the mechanisms described
in this paper. I showed that monetary policy could magnify inefficiencies and fragility that
can arise due to primitive information frictions.
According to the model, a crisis occurs following sharp reductions in investors’ confidence.
This prompts an abrupt withdrawal of capital from financial intermediaries and markets.
When the root cause of a crisis is investor pessimism, monetary policy can be highly ineffective in terms of transmitting liquidity through open market operations. In order to push
investment capital to financial markets, the central bank must push down risk free yields
sufficiently low such that investors find intermediary assets, which are marred by distrust
and pessimism, attractive. Without intervention, investors’ beliefs would rule these out as
a viable choice.
2

Goodhart (1999), regarding the intertwined nature between illiquidity and insolvency, states:
“ [...] nowadays illiquidity implies at least a suspicion of insolvency.”
3
See Bond and Glode (2014).
4
See Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
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Revitalizing investments requires rebuilding investors’ confidence in the financial system.
In general, lowering yields on safe assets, such as treasuries, simply forces investors to reluctantly consider alternatives, such as intermediary assets, which are regarded with skepticism.
Even more so, when markets are built by artificially lowering the return on safe assets create
a heavy reliance on central bank support. This was evident in 2013, when markets reacted
strongly to public contemplations by the Fed to taper on bond purchases.5 In view of the
model, investors’ participation in financial markets could not be self-sustained, as confidence
remained very low. Until investments are organically taking place, Fed actions may directly
factor into investment decisions and financial stability, putting disproportionate pressure to
maintain continued monetary support. This presents a limitation to the cost effectiveness
of ex-post monetary policy, and also highlights the importance of using ex-ante regulation
to prevent an escalation in systemic risk.

6.3. Leverage and Capital Requirements
A defining feature of financial crises is that intermediaries accumulate historically high
levels of leverage, or what is often ex-post described as “excessive leverage.” Highly leveraged
agents can become vulnerable to fluctuations in economic conditions when liquidity suddenly
becomes scarce. As such, one of the main advocated policies is the need for financial
regulators to curtail leverage. A common argument against blunt restrictions on leverage
is that doing so severely limits financial intermediaries’ ability to promote growth. Indeed,
absent information frictions, market forces can be sufficient to ensure that the financial
sector allocates capital prudently, as shown in Proposition 1. Financial sector leverage itself
may not necessarily be inefficient. In the context of the model, inefficiencies of leverage, in
the form of debt borrowing, are a symptom of asymmetric information. As such, a regulatory
constraint on borrowing, while limiting the amount of intermediation, will not prevent
inefficiencies. For instance, suppose that the intermediary faces a borrowing constraint k̄,
such that the intermediary’s permissible capital demand k is bounded above by k̄. It holds
5

See Feroli et al. (2014).
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generally, that in any nontrivial equilibrium:
Proposition 6. Suppose that the intermediary faces a borrowing constraint k̄. If (πH +
πM + πL α)R ≥ 1, then in any nontrivial equilibrium, the intermediary inefficiently produces
bad assets when θ = L.
In other words, while a borrowing constraint k̄ may limit the magnitude of potential inefficient production of assets, it may not alleviate the dual-inefficiency problem described in
Section 4.1.
The model presents a case in which investors fund the intermediary sector based on their
confidence in the intermediary sector’s access to productive investment opportunities. The
sustainability of intermediary leverage is predicated on the stability of investors beliefs. As
such, precautions must be taken with the build-up of belief-based leverage. Markets become
vulnerable when financial intermediaries are able to stretch their borrowing capacity based
on investors’ volatile beliefs. Amidst asymmetric information, observed leverage does not
imply an efficient outcome disciplined by the usual market forces.
Requiring financial intermediaries to maintain higher capital or equity ratios can help mitigate the situation, but it is not without limitations. First of all, using equity to finance
investments under asymmetric information will help reduce fragility as changes in investor
confidence does not result in early liquidation of assets. In addition, equity holders may
have greater incentives to acquire information, which might mitigate inefficient behavior.
Nonetheless, investors will still be subject to the adverse selection problems that lead to
the inefficient allocation of capital.
The use of retained earnings as a capital buffer is a powerful solution to costliness of equity
issuance and the asymmetric information problem.6 Suppose that in the model, the financial
intermediary sector is required to hold capital e at t = 0, which it is required to hold in safe
assets. I show that for sufficiently large e, separation can be restored between all types:7
6
7

This policy is also advocated in Admati et al. (2011).
In reality, financial intermediaries have circumvented capital requirements. Thus, for separation to hold,
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Proposition 7. Let e be the level of retained earnings that the intermediary sector holds
in the form of capital. For sufficiently large e > ē, first-best is restored.
Proposition 7 states that sufficient capitalization of the intermediary sector can alleviate
the problem of inefficient capital allocation and liquidity risk. This highlights two things.
First, because the main source of inefficiency is the misalignment between the intermediary
sector’s private incentives to intermediate and the public gains from intermediation, the
optimal policy entails restoring the discrepancy between the two. Retained earnings, or
inside equity, increases the accountability of the intermediary sector to any misinvestment
it may undertake. When the gains from risk-taking are outweighed by potential losses in its
accumulated earnings, inside equity e can deter the intermediary sector from misallocation
of capital.
Second, this underscores an ex-ante regulatory effect of inside equity. Capital buffers are
often advocated as a means to improve banks’ capacity to absorb liquidity or balance-sheet
shocks. By Proposition 7, inside equity is also vital for intermediaries to credibly commit
to increasing borrowing only when an abundance of good investment opportunities arise.8
Sufficient capitalization can actually improve the intermediary sector’s allocative role of
resources.
To the extent that moral hazard problems within the financial sectors exist, this also improves the private incentives for equity holders of financial intermediaries to monitor the
risk-taking.9 The appropriate capital requirement remains an empirical question.

6.4. Preventing a Crisis
The direct policy implication is to reduce information asymmetry, or prevent circumstances
in which investors with inferior information lend to intermediaries. However there are
political frictions that make it difficult to implement. In addition, it could discourage
regulation must take into account implicit leverage beyond the usual legal boundaries.
8
Other regulatory distortions besides asymmetric information may prevent voluntary accumulation of
equity capital, as shown in Admati et al. (2014).
9
Becht et al. (2011) concludes that shareholders did not actively oppose risk-taking by banks.
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financial innovation.
The private solution to the asymmetric information problem is information intermediaries,
such as credit rating agencies. These intermediaries normally function to reduce the informational gap between financial intermediaries and investors. Unfortunately, building up to
the global financial crisis, they failed to do so; asymmetries became more pronounced, which
may have led investors to develop wider priors on the underlying investment opportunities.10
Malfunctioning of well-defined credit ratings resulted in a breakdown in contract designs,
which relied on well defined states to base future contingencies. He et al. (2012) show that
mortgage-backed securities produced by issuers more likely to obtain inflated ratings also
provided investors with higher yields, suggesting not only the inefficacy of ratings, but also
revealing investors’ rational behavior of demanding higher returns. Regulation using credit
ratings likely worsened their efficacy.11 From investors’ perspectives, the use of shorter
term maturities may provide a partial remedy for settings where incomplete contracts pose
a serious issue.
If directly reducing information asymmetries is infeasible, policy should focus on barring
the financial sector from using privately optimal short-term leverage to take long-term
risks. This entails closely monitoring the method and level of leverage in the financial
sector. Overall, policy should aim to build a regulatory environment that encourages selfregulation, whether it pertains to the accountability of financial intermediaries, investors,
or regulators.

10
11

See Kartasheva and Yilmaz (2013).
See Opp et al. (2013).
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CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSION
In this paper, I propose a mechanism that explains crucial features of the development
of financial crises. In an economy where the financial intermediary sector plays a vital
role in allocating investment capital to long-term investment opportunities, I show that
asymmetric information between the financial intermediary sector and investors brings rise
to two distinct economic states, normal times and booms. Profit maximizing behavior of the
intermediary sector to intermediate large quantities of capital to promote growth, but also
potentially to take large, inefficient risks at the expense of investors leads to an endogenous
concentration of uncertainty in booms. Amidst an uncertain boom, investors’ beliefs exhibit
fragility; subsequent arrival of negative public information results in an abrupt loss of
confidence in the quality of intermediary assets. A crisis breaks out. Investors force early
liquidation on intermediary assets and flee to safe assets, in a flight-to-quality episode. In
contrast, during normal times, investors’ beliefs are resilient to a negative information signal
regarding the quality of intermediary investments. Normal times are quiet.
I derive two main policy implications. First, monetary policy can amplify the fragility of the
financial system by lowering investors’ aversion to adverse selection, and increasing investors’
propensity to force early liquidation. Second, I show that when the primitive source of
fragility is misaligned incentives, regulating intermediary equity not only alleviates the
build-up of fragility, but can also dramatically improves the efficiency of capital allocation.
There are several avenues for future research. The model can be extended to study the
nature of slow recoveries from financial crises, and the optimal policies to restore investors’
confidence and economic activity. Another promising direction is to incorporate important
aspects that are abstracted from in the current setting. These include the intermediary
role of liquidity creation, strategic interactions between financial intermediaries, and the
dynamics of asset prices.

44

REFERENCES
A. R. Admati, P. M. DeMarzo, M. F. Hellwig, and P. C. Pfleiderer. Fallacies, irrelevant
facts, and myths in the discussion of capital regulation: Why bank equity is not expensive.
Working Paper, 2011.
A. R. Admati, P. M. Demarzo, M. F. Hellwig, and P. Pfleiderer. The leverage ratchet effect.
Working Paper, 2014.
T. Adrian and H. S. Shin. Liquidity and leverage. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19
(3):418–437, 2010.
F. Allen and D. Gale. Optimal financial crises. Journal of Finance, 53(4):1245–1284, 1998.
F. Allen and D. Gale. Bubbles and crises. Economic Journal, 110(460):236–255, 2000.
F. Allen, A. Babus, and E. Carletti. Financial crises: Theory and evidence. Annual Review
of Financial Economics, 1(1):97–116, 2009.
W. Bagehot. Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. Kegan, Paul & Trench,
1888.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Equilibrium Definition
Definition 3. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is the intermediary’s financing decision
k ∗ (θ) and production decision strategies k∗ (θ) for θ ∈ {H, M, L}, the investors’ early liquidation strategy l∗ (k, y), the investors’ strategy on the funding rate r∗ (k), and investors’
beliefs B(k) such that:
1. For θ ∈ {H, M, L}, k ∗ (θ) and (kg∗ (θ), kb∗ (θ)) maximizes the expected profits of the
intermediary;
2. investors’ early liquidation strategy l∗ (k, y) maximizes conditional expected profits at
t = 1;
3. investors’ beliefs B(k) are consistent with Bayes’ Rule wherever possible;
4. investors break even given the funding rate r∗ (k) specified by the contract.

A.2. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. I show that the intermediary always weakly prefers to produce a good asset to a
bad asset. Consider the production decision of the intermediary with some k capital. First
consider when investors offer a funding rate r(k) conditional on some beliefs about (kg , kb )
such that Condition 1 is satisfied and kg ∈ (0, Kθ ), which implies that the intermediary
can strictly increase its production of good assets by reducing its production of bad assets.
By Lemma 2, investors never exercise early liquidation when y = G, which implies that

49

l(k, G) = 0. It holds that for any  ∈ (0, Kθ − kg ),


kg + 
kb − 
(kα(R − r(k)) + (1 − α) max{0, (kg + )R − kr(k)})
ρ
+ (1 − ρ)
k
k


kg + 
kb − 
+ (1 − l(k, B)) (1 − ρ)
(kα(R − r(k)) + (1 − α) max{0, (kg + )R − kr(k)})
+ρ
k
k


kg
kb
(kα(R − r(k)) + (1 − α) max{0, kg R − kr(k)})
≥ ρ + (1 − ρ)
k
k


kg
kb
+ (1 − l(k, B)) (1 − ρ) + ρ
(kα(R − r(k)) + (1 − α) max{0, kg R − kr(k)}) .
k
k
This implies that the intermediary can always weakly increase its profits by deviating to
produce a good asset in place of a bad asset. Furthermore, the intermediary strictly increases
its profits by deviating to producing kg +  good assets if kg R > kr(k) or if l(k, B) = 0 and
r(k) < R.
Next, consider when investors offer a funding rate r(k) conditional on some beliefs about
(kg , kb ) such that Condition 1 is satisfied and kg = Kθ . Then, for any  ∈ (0, Kθ ),



kg
kg
kb
kb
ρ + (1 − ρ) + (1 − l(k, B)) (1 − ρ) + ρ
k(R − r(k))
k
k
k
k


kg − 
kb + 
+ (1 − ρ)
(kα(R − r(k)) + (1 − α) max{0, (kg − )R − kr(k)})
≥ ρ
k
k


kg − 
kb + 
+ (1 − l(k, B)) (1 − ρ)
+ρ
(kα(R − r(k)) + (1 − α) max{0, (kg − )R − kr(k)})
k
k
This implies that the intermediary never finds it optimal to deviate to producing a bad
asset in place of a good asset. Altogether, this shows that given a choice, producing a good
asset (weakly) dominates producing a bad asset.
Lemma 4. Under symmetric information, a low type intermediary cannot obtain funding
from investors.
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Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Since KL = 0, a L-type intermediary can only produce bad assets. Hence, for any
asset production level k, the L-type intermediary’s portfolio is comprised of only bad assets.
For any k > 0, a portfolio with k assets produced by a L-type intermediary has expected
value of kαR < k. Since Condition 1 requires that r(k) ≤ R, investors do not provide
funding for a L-type intermediary for any k > 0.
Lemma 5. Under symmetric information, the intermediary produces at least Kθ good assets.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Consider the financing decision of an intermediary of type θ. Following Lemma 1, for
any capital demand k made by an intermediary of type θ where k ≤ Kθ , investors’ beliefs
are such that kg (θ) = k. Furthermore, by increasing production of good assets to Kθ , the
intermediary increases expected return by:

(Kθ − k)(R − 1) ≥ 0.

Hence, the intermediary is strictly better off by producing the maximum level of good
assets.
Lemma 6. Under symmetric information, the intermediary does not produce any bad assets
in equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. By Lemma 5, the intermediary choose to produce the maximum level of good assets.
Let this amount be some k 0 . By Lemma 4, a low type intermediary is not able to obtain
any funding, since for any k > 0, investors’ participation condition is not satisfied. Hence,
in equilibrium, investors never fund a low type, and a low type trivially produces no bad
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assets. Consider when k 0 > 0. If the intermediary produces more assets for a total of
k > k 0 , k − k 0 assets must be bad, since no additional good assets are available. Under
perfect information, investors know the level of k 0 and from Lemma 1, they can infer that
k − k 0 additional assets are bad assets. Given this, funding is only obtainable if given k 0
good assets and k − k 0 bad assets, Condition 1 is satisfied. Suppose that it holds. The
intermediary’s profits are:
αkR + (1 − α)k 0 R − k = k 0 (R − 1) + (k − k 0 )(αR − 1)
< k 0 (R − 1)

That is, since αR < 1, the intermediary is worse off by producing additional bad assets.
When Condition 1 is violated, investors do not provide funding to the intermediary. Hence,
it is optimal for the intermediary to demand k capital and produce k good assets.

Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. By Lemma 5, the intermediary always selects k ≥ Kθ . By Lemma 6, the intermediary
does not produce any bad assets. Since any production k > Kθ involves producing bad
assets, the intermediary selects k ∗ = Kθ .
Next, consider the investors’ liquidation decision given that the intermediary’s production
decision is k ∗ = Kθ . Given that the intermediary does not produce any bad assets, r(k) = 1,
and the intermediary is always able to pay investors the promised return. Since R < 1, at
t = 1, liquidation is never optimal. Hence, l∗ (k, y) = 0 for all k ∗ = k and y ∈ {G, B}.

Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Fix ρ =

1
2.

I show that for any γ ∈ (0, 1) and K > 0, there exists a (K1 , K2 )

equilibrium if and only if R > R̂, for threshold R̂ =

πH +πL
πH +πL α .

I conjecture and verify a

candidate (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium. Consider a pair (K1 , K2 ) such that K1 < γK < K2 and
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K1 = K2 ·

πH +πL
H +πL α

R− π

R−1

and consider the following investors’ beliefs about θ conditional on k:

θ=






H









L


w.p.

πH
πH +πL

w.p.

πL
πH +πL




M







L

if k = K2

if k = K1
otherwise.

Given these beliefs, the competitive rate is:

r(k) =

Since R >

πH +πL
πH +πL α ,




πH +πL


πH +πL α



1






∞

if K = K2
if K = K1
otherwise.

investors’ participation is individually rational for K1 and K2 . An

H-type intermediary finds K2 incentive compatible if:


πH + πL
≥ K1 (R − 1)
K2 R −
πH + πL α
Since K1 = K2 ·

πH +πL
H +πL α

R− π

R−1

, this holds. An L-type intermediary finds K2 incentive compat-

ible if:


πH + πL
αK2 R −
≥ αK1 (R − 1)
πH + πL α
This also holds since K1 = K2 ·

πH +πL
H +πL α

R− π

R−1

. An M -type intermediary finds K1 incentive

compatible if:




πH + πL
πH + πL
K1 (R − 1) ≥ αK2 R −
+ (1 − α) max 0, γKR − K2
πH + πL α
πH + πL α
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Substituting in K1 = K2 ·

K2 ·

R−

πH +πL
πH +πL α

!

R−1

πH +πL
H +πL α

R− π

R−1

,



πH + πL
(R − 1) = K2 R −
πH + πL α




πH + πL
πH + πL
≥ αK2 R −
+ (1 − α) max 0, γKR − K2
πH + πL α
πH + πL α

shows that the M -type intermediary’s incentive compatibility condition is satisfied. What
remains is to confirm that for any γ and K, there actually exists a pair (K1 , K2 ) such that
K1 < γK < K2 and K1 = K2 ·

πH +πL
H +πL α

R− π

R−1

. This requires that for any γ ∈ (0, 1) and K > 0,

there exists a K2 such that:

K2 ·

R−

πH +πL
πH +πL α

R−1

< γK < K2

Let K2 = K(γ + ) for some arbitrarily small  > 0. Then:

−γ

Since

πH +πL
πH +πL α

1−

R−

(γ + ) ·
!

πH +πL
πH +πL α

R−1

+·

R−

πH +πL
πH +πL α

R−1
+πL
R − ππHH+π
Lα
R−1

<γ <γ+
<0<

> 1, there exists some sufficiently small  such that the above inequality is

satisfied. Hence, the desired pair (K1 , K2 ) always exists for any γ and K. Together, this
verifies that as long as R > R̂, a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium always exists. To establish that
R > R̂ is a necessary condition for the existence of a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium, suppose by
contradiction that R < R̂ and a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium exists. For any K2 ≤ K, the expected
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value of the intermediary’s assets conditional on k ∗ = K2 is:
1
K



πH
πL
KR +
KαR
πH + πL
πH + πL



πH + πL α
R
πH + πL
πH + πL α
<
· R̂
πH + πL
=

= 1.

Since this violates investors’ participation condition, any (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium with K2 ≤ K
cannot exist. Note that for any K2 > K, expected value of the intermediary’s assets
conditional on k ∗ = K2 is:

1 
K2

K
K2


+ α K2K−K
πH
2
πH + πL




K2 R +

πL
K2 αR =
πH + πL
<

K
K2


+ α K2K−K
+ πL α
2
πH + πL

R

πH + πL α
R̂
πH + πL

= 1.

Since this also violates investors’ participation condition, any (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium with
K2 > K cannot exist. Hence, a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium does not exist when R < R̂.

Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. I show that no other equilibrium with partial or full separation between types exists that is nontrivial, in the sense that it is not strictly Pareto-dominated by a pooling
equilibrium.
In a fully separating equilibrium, k ∗ (θ0 ) 6= k ∗ (θ00 ) for any θ0 6= θ00 , for any θ0 , θ00 ∈ {H, M, L}.
By Lemma 4, an intermediary can not obtain funding from investors when investors believe
that the intermediary is a low type. This necessarily implies that in any fully separating equilibrium, k ∗ (L) = 0. Then, it suffices to show that a nontrivial fully separating
equilibrium does not exist if a low type intermediary can make positive profits for any
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k > 0. Suppose that there exists a separating equilibrium where k ∗ (M ) 6= k ∗ (H) and
k ∗ (M ), k ∗ (H) > 0, and suppose that an intermediary of type θ = M, H makes positive
expected profits from producing k ∗ (θ). This necessarily requires that r(k) < R. A fully
separating equilibrium exists only if for any such k ∗ (θ), the low type intermediary can not
make positive profits. Note, however, that for any such k ∗ (θ), a low type’s profits are:
αk ∗ (θ)(R − r(k)) > 0

Hence, for any production level such that a moderate or high type intermediary can make
positive profits, the low type can make positive profits by deviating to their production
level. This rules out the existence of any nontrivial fully separating equilibrium. There is a
knife-edge equilibrium where the intermediary produces sufficiently many bad assets such
that r(k) = R. This ensures that the intermediary never makes positive profits. Only in
this case is the intermediary of low type indifferent between producing no assets and some
assets. This case is strictly dominated by an uninformative equilibrium, where all types
choose to produce  assets, for arbitrarily small . I ignore this knife-edge case.
Next, I check that nonexistence of the other possible candidate partial separating equilibria
where (i) H and M pool, and L separates; and (ii) M and L pool, and H separates. First,
note that the argument for the nonexistence of a fully separating equilibrium holds directly
for establishing that there can not exist an equilibrium where the H and M pool, and L
separates. It remains to show that there can not exist an equilibrium where the M and L
pool, and H separates.
Consider an candidate equilibrium where M and L pool at production level K 0 , and H
separates at K 00 . I show that there does not exist such form of equilibrium in which H is
strictly better off choosing K 00 over K 0 .
First, note that for any k < KM , an intermediary of moderate and high type can achieve the
same maximum profits under any investors’ beliefs. This follows because for any k < KM ,
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as a result of Lemma 1, an intermediary of either type will produce only good assets. Since
both produce the same quality portfolio given production k, their profits are identical.
Second, note that for any k > KM , a high type intermediary is always able to obtain
weakly higher profits than a moderate type intermediary. This is because an intermediary
that produces portfolio (kg , kb ) expects profits:

1{kb >0} · α max{kR − kr(k), 0} + 1 − 1{kb >0} · α max{kg R − kr(k), 0},


which (weakly) increase in kg and (weakly) decrease in kb . Consider when K 00 < KH .
Since the H type separates, and only good assets are produced, r(K 00 ) = 1. In order for
the L type to weakly prefer K 0 to K 00 , it must be that K 0 > K 00 , since it is always true
that r(K 0 ) > 1 for any K 0 . However, for a moderate type to prefer K 0 to K 00 , K 0 must
necessarily be less than KM . By contradiction, suppose not. For any K 0 > KM , a moderate
type intermediary’s expect profit is:
αK 0 (R − r(K 0 )) + (1 − α) max{KM R − K 0 r(K 0 ), 0}.
When KM R > K 0 r(K 0 ), the moderate type’s profits decrease in K 0 . When KM R <
K 0 r(K 0 ), the moderate type’s profit is:
αK 0 (R − r(K 0 )).

The differential with respect to K 0 is:
α(R − r(K 0 )) − K 0

which is less than zero, since

∂r(K 0 )
∂K 0

∂r(K 0 )
∂K 0

> 0. Hence, the moderate type intermediary’s profit

in this candidate equilibrium decreases as K 0 > KM increases. There does not exist a K 00
is such that a moderate type is indifferent between deviating to K 00 and producing the
equilibrium level K 0 : if K 00 < KM , the high type is strictly better off by deviating to K 0 ;
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K 00 cannot be greater than KM , since for any K 00 ∈ (KM , K 00 ),
αK 00 (R − 1) + (1 − α) max{KM R − K 00 , 0} > αK 0 (R − r(K 0 )) + (1 − α) max{KM R − K 0 r(K 0 ), 0}.
This rules out a the candidate partial separating equilibrium with K 0 > KM . As such,
consider when K 00 ≤ K 0 ≤ KM . For any K 0 , there exists a sufficiently small K 00 such that
both a moderate and high type intermediary is indifferent between K 0 and K 00 , since there
always exists a K 00 such that:
K 00 (R − 1) = K 0 (R − r(K 0 )).

However, consider a pooling equilibrium in which all types produce K 0 . Let the equilibrium
interest rate in this pooling equilibrium be denoted rp (·). It holds with loss of generality
that:
K 0 (R − rp (K 0 )) > K 0 (R − r(K 0 )) = K 00 (R − 1).

As such, the partial separating equilibrium described above is Pareto-dominated. Finally,
consider when K 00 > KH . As before, the L type to weakly prefer K 0 to K 00 only if:
αK 0 (R − r(K 0 )) ≤ αK 00 (R − r(K 00 )).

This requires K 00 to be sufficiently high such that r(K 00 )  r(K 0 ). Suppose that K 00 satisfies
r(K 00 )  r(K 0 ). In this case, the H type obtains profits:
αK 00 (R − r(K 00 )) + (1 − α) max{KH R − K 00 r(K 00 ), 0}.
If KH R > K 00 r(K 00 ), then this equals to:
K 00 (R − r(K 00 )) − (1 − α)(K 00 − KH )R.
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However, K 00 is required to satisfy K 00 (R − r(K 00 )) ≤ K 0 (R − r(K 0 )). This implies that
K 00 (R − r(K 00 )) − (1 − α)(K 00 − KH )R ≤ K 0 (R − r(K 0 )) − (1 − α)(K 00 − KH )R
≤ K 0 (R − r(K 0 )) − (1 − α)(K 0 − KH )R
This rules out any equilibrium with K 0 < K 00 , since otherwise the H type find it optimal to
deviate to K 0 and obtain K 0 (R − r(K 0 )). Finally, since a M type strictly prefers to produce
less for any k > KM , there can not exist the equilibrium with K 0 > K 00 .

Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Fix ρ = 12 . The efficient (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium can be identified in two steps. First,
I characterize a necessary and sufficient condition for a equilibrium to be the most efficient
(K1 , K2 ) equilibrium by conjecturing and verifying a criterion. Second, I use this condition
to explicitly identify the efficient equilibrium.
I conjecture and verify that the efficient (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium is a pair (K10 , K20 ) that takes:
1. conditional on K2 = K, take candidate K10 to be the maximum k ≤ γK subject to an
H and L-type intermediary’s incentive compatibility condition;
2. if the candidate K10 = γK, the maximum K20 ∈ (γK, K] subject to an M -type intermediary’s incentive compatibility condition; otherwise take K20 = K.
By construction, K10 satisfies the H and L type intermediary’s incentive compatibility condition given K2 = K, and K20 satisfies the M type intermediary’s incentive compatibility
condition given K10 . I verify that this (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium is the efficient (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium.
First, suppose that (K10 , K20 ) = (γK, K). Since KM = γK, for any K100 > γK, the M type intermediary produces bad assets. Even if such K1 satisfies a high and low type
intermediary’s incentive compatibility condition, since αR < 1, K100 is strictly dominated by
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K10 – producing K10 instead of K100 yields an ex-ante efficiency gain of:
πM (K100 − K10 )(1 − αR) > 0.
Similarly, KH = K, for any K200 > K, the H-type intermediary also produces bad assets.
Even if K200 satisfies a moderate type intermediary’s incentive compatibility condition, K200
is strictly dominated by K200 since producing K20 instead of K200 yields an efficiency gain of:
(πH + πL )(K200 − K20 )(1 − αR) > 0.
For any K200 ∈ (γK, K), the H type intermediary forgoes good investment opportunities.
Even if K200 satisfies a moderate type intermediary’s incentive compatibility condition, K200
is strictly dominated by K200 since producing K20 instead of K200 yields an efficiency gain of:
(K20 − K200 ) ((πH + απL )R − (πH + πL )) > 0.

Since even if incentive compatibility conditions hold, any deviation away from (γK, K) is
ex-ante more inefficient, when (K10 , K20 ) = (γK, K), it is the efficient (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium.
Next, consider when (K10 , K20 ) = (γK, K20 ), where K20 < K is the maximum investment such
that the M -type intermediary’s incentive compatibility condition is satisfied, conditional on
K10 = γK. As argued earlier, the M -type intermediary obtains the highest possible profits
when K1 = γK. Hence, when K1 = γK, incentives to deviate from K1 are the weakest.
Given this, K20 is the largest permissible investment level for the pool for any value of K1 .
Since within the interval (γK, K), efficiency increases with investment, any other K2 ≤ K20
is less efficient.
Finally, consider when (K10 , K20 ) = (K10 , K), where K10 < γK is the maximum investment
such that an H and L-type intermediary’s incentive compatibility condition is satisfied,
conditional on K20 = K. For the H and L type pool, the highest efficiency is obtained when
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K2 = K. At K2 = K, the high-type intermediary has the weakest incentives to deviate,
since it is the globally most profitable production level in any (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium. Since,
for any K2 ≤ K, both the high and low type have the same preferences, K10 is the largest
permissible investment level for the M -type intermediary for any value of K2 . Since within
the interval (0, γK), efficiency increases with investment, any other K1 ≤ K10 is less efficient.
This verifies that the criterion identifies the ex-ante efficient (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium. I use
this criterion to identify the efficient equilibrium for the entire interval of γ ∈ (0, 1). Using
the above criterion, note that conditional on K2 = K, the candidate K10 must satisfy:
K10 (R − 1) ≤ K (R − r(k))


πH + πL
.
=K R−
πH + πL α
Let γ̂ ∈ (0, 1) be such that:


πH + πL
γ̂K(R − 1) = K R −
.
πH + πL α
Hence, K10 = min{γ, γ̂}, where γ̂ =

πH +πL
H +πL α

R− π

R−1

. Next, suppose that γ < γ̂. The candidate

K20 must satisfy:
γK(R − 1) ≥

If γK − K20 ·

αK20

πH +πL
πH +πL α



πH + πL
R−
πH + πL α




+ (1 − α) max γKR −

K20


πH + πL
·
,0 .
πH + πL α

≥ 0, then:

πH + πL
γK(R − 1) ≥ K20 ·
(R − 1)
πH + πL α


πH + πL
0
> K2 R −
− (1 − α)γKR.
πH + πL α
The inequality holds for K20 = K when γK − K20 ·
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πH +πL
πH +πL α

≥ 0. Next, consider when

γK − K20 ·

πH +πL
πH +πL α

≤ 0. Then the inequality that K20 must satisfy is:
γK(R − 1) ≥

αK20



πH + πL
R−
.
πH + πL α

Note that:


πH + πL
αγ̂K(R − 1) = αK R −
πH + πL α


.

Hence, when γ > αγ̂, the inequality is satisfied for K20 = K. When γ < αγ̂, the maximum
value of K20 is given by:
K20 =
=

γK(R − 1)
+πL
R − ππHH+π
Lα
γ
K.
αγ̂

Gathering all the cases, I obtain:
1. (γ̂K, K) if γ > γ̂;
2. (γK, K) if γ ∈ (αγ̂, γ̂);
3.



γ
γK, αγ̂
K



if γ < αγ̂.

Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose that investors provide capital k to an intermediary under beliefs such that
Condition 1 is satisfied. When the type of the intermediary is certain, investors can infer
the quality of the underlying assets. As a result, r(k) is set such that the expected return
on debt is 1. Since y provides no new information to investors, liquidation is never optimal,
since R < 1.
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Suppose that investors face uncertainty about the type of the intermediary. Without loss
of generality, suppose that investors’ beliefs conditional on observing k capital demand is:

θ=

for πθ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that

P

θ





H





0
w.p. πH
0
w.p. πM

M






L

w.p. πL0

πθ0 = 1. Let (kg (θ), kb (θ)), where kg (θ) + kb (θ) = k, represent

the portfolio of an intermediary of type θ that produces k assets. Then, given investors’
beliefs, the expected value of kg conditional on y = G is:

X

kg (θ)πθ0

θ

·

kg (θ)
+ (1 − ρ) kbk(θ)
k

P 0  kg (θ)
kb (θ)
θ πθ ρ k + (1 − ρ) k

ρ

WLOG, let kg (θ0 ) ≥ kg (θ00 ) ≥ kg (θ000 ), where θ0 , θ00 ,0 θ000 ∈ {H, M, L} and θ0 6= θ00 6= θ000 .
Rewriting the expression:
X

kg (θ)πθ0

·

θ

kg (θ)
kb (θ)
k + (1 − ρ) k


P 0
kg (θ)
kb (θ)
π
ρ
+
(1
−
ρ)
θ θ
k
k

ρ

k (θ00 )

k (θ0 )

0

= kg (θ ) ·

πθ0 0

(2ρ − 1) g k + (1 − ρ)
(2ρ − 1) g k + (1 − ρ)

 + kg (θ00 ) · πθ0 00 · P


·P
0 (2ρ − 1) kg (θ) + (1 − ρ)
0 (2ρ − 1) kg (θ) + (1 − ρ)
π
π
θ θ
θ θ
k
k
k (θ000 )

(2ρ − 1) g k + (1 − ρ)


+ kg (θ ) ·
·P
0 (2ρ − 1) kg (θ) + (1 − ρ)
π
θ θ
k


kg (θ0 )−kg (θ00 )
kg (θ0 )−kg (θ000 )
0
0
+ πθ000 (2ρ − 1)
π 00 (2ρ − 1)
k

 k
= kg (θ0 ) · πθ0 0 · 1 + θ
P 0
kg (θ)
θ πθ (2ρ − 1) k + (1 − ρ)


00
0
00
000
0 (2ρ − 1) kg (θ )−kg (θ ) + π 0 (2ρ − 1) kg (θ )−kg (θ )
π
0
000
θ
k

 k
+ kg (θ00 ) · πθ0 00 · 1 + θ
P 0
kg (θ)
θ πθ (2ρ − 1) k + (1 − ρ)


000
0
000
00
0 (2ρ − 1) kg (θ )−kg (θ ) + π 0 (2ρ − 1) kg (θ )−kg (θ )
π
0
00
θ
k

 k
+ kg (θ000 ) · πθ0 000 · 1 + θ
P 0
kg (θ)
+
(1
−
ρ)
π
(2ρ
−
1)
θ θ
k
000

πθ0 000
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The remainder after taking away

P

θ

kg (θ)πθ0 is positive if:


kg (θ0 ) − kg (θ00 )
kg (θ0 ) − kg (θ000 )
0
kg (θ ) ·
− 1)
+ πθ000 (2ρ − 1)
k
k


00
0
kg (θ ) − kg (θ )
kg (θ00 ) − kg (θ000 )
00
0
0
0
+ kg (θ ) · πθ00 πθ0 (2ρ − 1)
+ πθ000 (2ρ − 1)
k
k

000 ) − k (θ 0 )
000 ) − k (θ 00 ) 
k
(θ
k
(θ
g
g
g
g
+ kg (θ000 ) · πθ0 000 πθ0 0 (2ρ − 1)
+ πθ0 00 (2ρ − 1)
k
k


∝ kg (θ0 ) · πθ0 0 πθ0 00 kg (θ0 ) − kg (θ00 ) + πθ0 000 kg (θ0 ) − kg (θ000 )


+ kg (θ00 ) · πθ0 00 πθ0 0 kg (θ00 ) − kg (θ0 ) + πθ0 000 kg (θ00 ) − kg (θ000 )


+ kg (θ000 ) · πθ0 000 πθ0 0 kg (θ000 ) − kg (θ0 ) + πθ0 00 kg (θ000 ) − kg (θ00 )


= kg (θ0 ) − kg (θ00 ) kg (θ0 )πθ0 0 πθ0 00 − kg (θ00 )πθ0 0 πθ0 00


+ kg (θ0 ) − kg (θ000 ) kg (θ0 )πθ0 0 πθ0 000 − kg (θ000 )πθ0 0 πθ0 000


+ kg (θ00 ) − kg (θ000 ) kg (θ00 )πθ0 00 πθ0 000 − kg (θ000 )πθ0 0 πθ0 000
2
2
2
= kg (θ0 ) − kg (θ00 ) πθ0 0 πθ0 00 + kg (θ0 ) − kg (θ000 ) πθ0 0 πθ0 000 + kg (θ00 ) − kg (θ000 ) πθ0 00 πθ0 000
0

πθ0 0



πθ0 00 (2ρ

>0

Hence, investors’ belief about the intermediary’s assets improves after y = G. Since r(k)
is set such that the expected return on debt is 1 given ex-ante beliefs, following y = G,
the expected return on debt increases. Again, early liquidation is never optimal, since
R < 1.

Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Consider the investors’ liquidation decision:

l(k, y) =




0

if



1

otherwise

E [D2 (k(θ), kg (θ), r0 (k))| k, y] > R

64

.

The expected value of the debt claim conditional on k and y can be reorganized such that:


P


πθ (k)
E [D2 (k(θ), r0 (k))| k, y] = E P
|k
θ πθ (k) · ω(k(θ))


 P  k (θ)
kb (θ)
g
(1
−
ρ)
+
ρ
·
π
(k)
·
ω(k(θ))
θ
θ
k
k

|k, y = B 
· E
P  kg (θ)
kb (θ)
θ
k (1 − ρ) + k ρ · πθ (k)
−1

E[ω(k(θ))|k]
=
E[ω(k(θ))|k, y = B]
θ

= F (k)−1

Hence, l(k, y) = 1 is optimal if and only if F (k)−1 < R.

Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. I show that a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium exists when ρ < max{ρ̂, ρ̌} and R > R̂, for some
thresholds ρ̂, ρ̌. Furthermore, I show that when ρ ∈ [ρ̌, ρ̂], where ρ̌ < ρ̂ for sufficiently small
α, investors force liquidation in equilibrium if and only if k ∗ = K2 and y = B.
I show this in three steps. First, I show that conditional on l(K2 , B) = 1, there exists a pair
(K1 , K2 ) such that the (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium structure is incentive compatible for all types
of the intermediary for some ρ ≤ ρ̂. Second, I show that given an incentive compatible pair
(K1 , K2 ), l(K2 , B) = 1 is the equilibrium strategy of investors for ρ > ρ̌. Lastly, I show that
for α ≤ ᾱ, thresholds ρ̌ and ρ̂ are such that ρ̌ < ρ̂ and verify that investors’ participation
condition is satisfied as long as R > R̂.
Step 1. Assume that investors’ liquidation strategy is l(K2 , B) = 1. Note that by Lemma
2, in a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium, it suffices to consider liquidation only when k ∗ = K2 and
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y = B. As such l(k, y) = 0 if (k, y) 6= (K2 , B). Suppose that investors’ beliefs are:

θ=






H









L


w.p.

πH
πH +πL

w.p.

πL
πH +πL




M







L

Let γ̌ = (1 − ρ) ·

R−rK
R−1 ,

if k = K2

if k = K1
otherwise.

where rK is given by:

rK =

(πH + πL ) − ((1 − ρ)πH + ρπL ) R
.
ρπH + (1 − ρ)πL α

There are four potential cases to consider:
(a) γ <

rK
R

and γ < γ̌

(b) γ <

rK
R

and γ > γ̌

(c) γ >

rK
R

and γ < γ̌

(d) γ >

rK
R

and γ > γ̌.

Conditional on investors’ beliefs and liquidation strategies specified above, for any K1 and
K2 such that K1 ≤ γK ≤ K2 , the competitive rate is:

r(k) =




r2 (K2 )




1






∞

if k = K2
if k = K1
otherwise,
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where r2 (K2 ) is given by:

r2 (K2 ) =




rK

if K2 ≤ K




K −K
K
+ρ 2K
πH +ρπL R
(πH +πL )− (1−ρ) K

2 
2



K −K
K
ρK
+(1−ρ) 2K
πH +(1−ρ)πL α
2

if K2 > K

2

Note that rK and r2 (K2 ) is a function of ρ. Sufficient conditions are identified by first
characterizing the conditions on ρ such that a incentive compatible pair (K1 , K2 ) exists,
conditional on γ obeying one of four cases (a) − (d). I show that for each case, an upper
bound on ρ is required. As long as ρ is such that all upper bound conditions on ρ are
satisfied for the four possible cases, the existence of an incentive compatible (K1 , K2 ) pair
is ensured.
case (a). Let γ < min

r

K

R

, γ̌ . I show that there exists a threshold ρ̂(a) such that for

ρ < ρ̂(a) , the pair (γK, γγ̌ K) is incentive compatible. The low type incentive condition is:
γ
γK(R − 1) ≤ (1 − ρ) K(R − rK ).
γ̌
K
This holds, since γ̌ ≤ (1 − ρ) R−r
R−1 by definition. The high type incentive condition is:

γ
γK(R − 1) ≤ ρ K(R − rK ),
γ̌
which always holds since ρ > 21 . The moderate type incentive condition is:

γK(R − 1) ≥

γK
γK
ρ γ + (1 − ρ) 1 − γ
K
γ̌
γ̌ K
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!!

γ
Kα(R − rK ).
γ̌

Organizing the inequality:

γ̌(R − 1) ≥ (ργ̌ + (1 − ρ) (1 − γ̌)) α(R − rK )
γ̌ ≥ (ργ̌ + (1 − ρ) (1 − γ̌)) α

R − rK
R−1

1 − ρ ≥ (γ̌(2ρ − 1) + (1 − ρ)) α
(1 − ρ)(1 − α) ≥ γ̌(2ρ − 1)α
1−ρ 1−α
≥ γ̌
2ρ − 1 α
1 1−α
R − rK
≥
2ρ − 1 α
R−1
R−rK
R−1

Since rK is bounded below by 1,

is bounded above by 1. Since limρ→ 1
2

1
2ρ−1

= ∞,

there exists a threshold ρ̂(a) such that:
1−α
R − rK
=
2ρ̂(a) − 1 α
R−1


1 1−α R−1
ρ̂(a) =
2
α R − rK
1

Hence, for any for any γ < min

r

K

R

, γ̌ , there exists an incentive compatible (K1 , K2 ) pair

for ρ < ρ̂(a) .
case (b). Let γ be such that γ̌ < γ <

rK
R .

I show that there exists a threshold ρ̂(b) such that

for ρ < ρ̂(b) , the pair (γ̌K, K) is incentive compatible. The low type incentive condition is:

γ̌K(R − 1) ≤ (1 − ρ)K(R − rK ).

This holds with equality. The high type incentive condition is:

γ̌K(R − 1) ≤ ρK(R − rK ),
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which always holds since ρ > 21 . The moderate type incentive condition is:
γ̌K(R − 1) ≥ (ργ + (1 − ρ) (1 − γ)) Kα(R − rK ).

Organizing the inequality:

(1 − ρ)K(R − rK ) ≥ (ργ + (1 − ρ) (1 − γ)) Kα(R − rK )
(1 − ρ)(1 − α) ≥ (2ρ − 1)αγ
1−ρ 1−α
·
≥γ
2ρ − 1
α
Since γ <
limρ→ 1
2

1−ρ
2ρ−1

rK
R ,

this holds for any γ ∈ γ̌, rRK



if

1−ρ
ρ

·

1−α
α

>

rK
R .

Since

rK
R

≤ 1 and

= ∞, there exists a threshold ρ̂(b) such that:
rK
1−α
=
(2ρ̂(b) − 1)
α
R

1 − α rK
1−α
rK
+
= 2
+
ρ̂(b)
α
R
R
α
rK
1−α
α + R
ρ̂(b) = 1−α
rK
α +2 R

(1 − ρ̂(b) ) ·

This implies that for any γ where γ̌ < γ <

rK
R ,

there exists a incentive compatible pair

(K1 , K2 ) as long as ρ < ρ̂(b) .
case (c). Let γ be such that

rK
R

< γ < γ̌. I show that the pair (γK, K) is incentive

compatible. The low type incentive condition is:

γK(R − 1) ≤ (1 − ρ)K(R − rK ),

which always holds since γ < γ̌. The high type incentive condition is:

γK(R − 1) ≤ ρK(R − rK ),

which always holds since ρK(R − rK ) > (1 − ρ)K(R − rK ) > γK(R − 1). The moderate
69

type incentive condition is:

γK(R − 1) ≥ (ργ + (1 − ρ) (1 − γ)) (K(R − rK ) − (1 − α)(1 − γ)KR) .

Note that the RHS is bounded above by K(R − rK ) − (1 − α)(1 − γ)KR. Hence, it suffices
to show that:

γ(R − 1) ≥ (R − rK ) − (1 − α)(1 − γ)R
rK − γ ≥ (1 − (1 − α)(1 − γ) − γ)R
rK − γ ≥ α(1 − γ)R
γ(rK − 1) ≥ (1 − γ)(αR − rK ),

which holds since rK > 1 and αR < 1. Hence, the moderate type incentive condition holds.
case (d). Let γ be such that γ > max

r

K

R

, γ̌ . I show that for some K2 <

KR
r2 (K2 ) ,

a pair

(K1 , K2 ), where K1 ≤ γK < K2 is incentive compatible as long as ρ < ρ̂(d) for threshold
ρ̂(d) . The low type incentive condition is:

K1 (R − 1) ≤ (1 − ρ)K2 (R − r2 (K2 ))

Hence, as long as K2 ≥

K1 (R−1)
(1−ρ)(R−r2 (K2 ) ,

the low type incentive condition is satisfied. Next,

consider the moderate type incentive condition:

K1 (R − 1) ≥




γK
γK
ρ
+ (1 − ρ) 1 −
(αK2 (R − r2 (K2 )) + (1 − α) max{γKR − K2 r2 (K2 ), 0})
K2
K2

Next, consider the high type incentive condition:

K1 (R − 1) ≤






 ρ K + (1 − ρ) 1 −
K2

K
K2



(K2 (R − r2 (K2 )) − (1 − α)(K2 − K)R)



ρK2 (R − rK )

if K2 > K
if K2 ≤ K
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+
(1
−
ρ)
1−
First, since ρ γK
K2

γK
K2



strictly increases in γ and αK2 (R − r2 (K2 )) + (1 −

α) max{γKR − K2 r2 (K2 ), 0} (weakly) increases in γ, for any (K10 , K20 ) such that
K10 (R





γK
γK
− 1) = ρ 0 + (1 − ρ) 1 − 0
αK20 (R − r2 (K20 )) + (1 − α) max{γKR − K20 r2 (K20 ), 0} ,
K2
K2
(A.1)

the high type incentive condition always holds, i.e.
K10 (R





K
K
αK20 (R − r2 (K20 )) + (1 − α) max{KR − K20 r2 (K20 ), 0} .
− 1) ≤ ρ 0 + (1 − ρ) 1 − 0
K2
K2

Hence, it suffices to show that there exists a (K1 , K2 ) pair such that K1 ≤ γK and K2 ≥
K1 (R−1)
(1−ρ)(R−r2 (K2 ) ,

where Condition (A.1) is satisfied. Note that r2 (K2 ) monotonically increases

in K2 . Hence, there exists some K2,M such that K2,M r2 (K2,M ) = γKR. A moderate type’s
expected profit for k = K2,M is:



K
K
ρ
+ (1 − ρ) 1 −
(αK2,M (R − r2 (K2,M )) + (1 − α) max{γKR − K2,M r2 (K2,M ), 0})
K2,M
K2,M



K
K
+ (1 − ρ) 1 −
= ρ
αK2,M (R − r2 (K2,M ))
K2,M
K2,M



K
K
= ρ
+ (1 − ρ) 1 −
α(K2,M − γK)R
K2,M
K2,M
which monotonically increases in ρ. Note that:




K
K
ρ
+ (1 − ρ) 1 −
α(K2,M − γK)R < α(K2,M − γK)R
K2,M
K2,M
< K2,M − γK
< γK(R − 1).

Separately, let K1,L (k, ρ) for k ≥ K be such that:

K1,L (k)(R − 1) = k(1 − ρ)(R − r2 (k))
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Let ρ̂(d) be such that:

1 − ρ̂(d)




γK
γK
+ (1 − ρ̂(d) ) 1 −
α
= ρ̂(d)
K2,M
K2,M

Then, for ρ = ρ̂(d) , γK > K1,L (K2,M , ρ). Consider a pair (K1 , K2 ) where K1 = min{K1,L (K2,M , ρ), γK}
and K2 = K2,M . Let ρ́ be such that K1,L (K2,M , ρ́) = γK. Note that K1,L (K2,M , ρ) de

creases in ρ ∈ ( 21 , 1). For ρ ∈ max{ρ́, 12 }, ρ̂(d) ,
K1 (R − 1) ≤ (1 − ρ)K2 (R − r2 (K2 ))



γK
γK
αK2,M (R − r2 (K20 ))
K1 (R − 1) ≥ ρ
+ (1 − ρ) 1 −
K2,H
K2,M




K
K
K1 (R − 1) < ρ
+ (1 − ρ) 1 −
K2,M (R − r2 (K20 )) − (1 − α)(K2,M − K)R
K2,M
K2,M
which correspond to the incentive conditions for the low, moderate, and high type, respec

tively. Hence, existence of an incentive compatible pair is established for ρ ∈ max{ρ́, 21 }, ρ̂(d)

when ρ > max rRK , γ̌ .
Together, to ensure the existence of an incentive compatible pair (K1 , K2 ), ρ must be
sufficiently low, such that ρ < ρ̂, where ρ̂ = min{ρ̂(a) , ρ̂(b) , ρ̂(d) }.
Step 2. Next, I show that for sufficiently large ρ, investors’ optimal liquidation strategy
entails l(K2 , B) = 1. Since the asset choice of a high type and a low type is constant for
any k ≤ K and variable (for the high type) over k > K, there are two cases to consider:
(i) K2 ≤ K
(ii) K2 > K
case (i) First, consider any K2 ≤ K. F (K2 ) is given by:

F (K2 ) =

πH +πL α
πH +πL
(1−ρ)πH +ρπL α
(1−ρ)πH +ρπL
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.

Hence, l(K2 , B) = 1 is optimal when:
F (K2 )−1 < R
πH + πL (1 − ρ)πH + ρπL α
< R,
·
πH + πL α (1 − ρ)πH + ρπL
which holds for ρ > ρ̌K , where

ρ̌K =

πH ((1 − R)πH + (1 − αR)πL )
.
πH ((1 − R)πH + (1 − αR)πL ) + πL ((R − α)πH + (1 − R)απL )

case (ii) When K2 > K. F (K2 ) is given by:

F (K2 ) =

πH +πL α
πH +πL



K
K
(1−ρ) K
+ρ 1− K
πH +ρπL α
2
2



K
K
(1−ρ) K +ρ 1− K
πH +ρπL
2

.

2

Hence, l(K2 , B) = 1 is optimal when:
F (K2 )−1 < R




K
K
(1
−
ρ)
+
ρ
1
−
πH + ρπL α
K2
K2
πH + πL


· 
< R,
πH + πL α
(1 − ρ) KK2 + ρ 1 − KK2
πH + ρπL
which holds for ρ > ρ̌(K2 ), where
(R(πH + πL α) − (πH + πL )) KK2 πH


.
ρ̌(K2 ) =
((πH + πL ) − R(πH + πL α)) 1 − 2 KK2 πH + (α(πH + πL ) − R(πH + πL α)) πL
Together, a fragile (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium requires ρ̌K < ρ < ρ̂ if K2 ≤ K and ρ̌(K2 ) < ρ < ρ̂
if K2 ≥ K. Let ρ̌ = ρ̌K if K2 ≤ K and ρ̌ = ρ̌(K2 ) if K2 ≥ K. I show that for any case
identified above, for sufficiently small α, there exists a non-degenerate set of values of ρ such
that a fragile (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium exists. It suffices to show that for any γ, there exists
some α ∈ (0, 1) such that the thresholds on permissible values of ρ are strictly ordered. I
show by using a limit argument. Consider the limit case, as α → 0. Then ρ̂(b) , ρ̂(d) → 1
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and ρ̂(a) → ∞. Since as α → 0, ρ̌ →

(1−R)πH +πL
(1−R)πH +πL +πL R

< 1, there always exists a sufficiently

small α > 0 such that ρ̌(K) < ρ̂. Finally, the investors’ participation condition for K2 ≤ K
is satisfied for any R such that R >

πH +πL
πH +πL α

= R̂.

Together this establishes that for any γ, for ρ ≤ min{ρ̂(a) , ρ̂(b) , ρ̂(d) }, there exists a (K1 , K2 )
equilibrium. Furthermore, for any ρ < ρ̌, a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium exists. Since the revelation
of information for some noisy signal with precision ρ >

1
2

is not sufficient to trigger early

liquidation l(K2 , B) = 1, an equilibrium exists in which no liquidation takes place on the
equilibrium path. This corresponds to the set of equilibria described in Theorem 1. Finally,
for sufficiently small α, there exists a fragile (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium for any ρ ∈ (ρ̌, ρ̂).

Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose that ρ ∈ (ρ̌, ρ̂), such that l∗ (K2 , B) = 1. This implies that:

E







1
min r0 (K2 ), R̃(k(θ)) y = B < R
k

Note that r0 (K2 ) is such that:






1
P (y = B|k) · E min r0 (K2 ), R̃(k(θ)) y = B
k




1
+P (y = G|k) · E min r0 (K2 ), R̃(k(θ)) y = G = 1.
k
Note also that given l∗ (K2 , B) = 1, r(K2 ) is such that:

P (y = B|k) · R
+P (y = G|k) ·

Since

h

n

E
o






1
min r(K2 ), R̃(k(θ)) y = G = 1.
k
i

E min r0 (K2 ), k1 R̃(k(θ)) y = B < R,




1
k



E min r(K2 ), R̃(k(θ))


y=G <





1
k



E min r0 (K2 ), R̃(k(θ))

74


y=G .

This directly implies that r(K2 ) < r0 (K2 ).

Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. First consider the generalized form of Condition 1:


E


X

 

P rob(y = y 0 |k) max E D2 (k(θ), R)|k, y 0 , R  ≥ Rf,0 · Rf,1 .

y 0 ∈{G,B}

It follows directly that a decrease Rf,0 · Rf,1 generically loosens the above condition. Next,
consider the generalized form of investors’ liquidation condition:

l(k, y) =




0

if



1

otherwise

h

o

n

i

E min r0 (k), k1 R̃(k(θ)) k, y > R · Rf,1

.

Without loss of generality, let investors’ beliefs, conditional on k ∗ = k 0 be:

θ=

for πθ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that

P

θ





H





0
w.p. πH
0
w.p. πM

M






L

w.p. πL0

πθ0 = 1, and let k0 (θ) correspond to the asset choices of the

intermediary. Then:

E





1
0
min r(k), R̃(k (θ)) k, y
k


= Rf,0 · Rf,1 ·

0
πH

+

0
πH
0
πM

0 + π0
+ πM
L
· ω(k0 (M )) +

P  kg (θ)
πL0 α

·

|

θ


kb (θ)
(1
−
ρ)
+
ρ
· πθ0 · ω(k0 (θ))
k0
k0

P  kg (θ)
kb (θ)
(1
−
ρ)
+
ρ
· πθ0
0
0
θ
k
k
{z
}
X

Note that ω(k0 (θ)) depends only on Rf,0 · Rf,1 . Hence, holding Rf,0 · Rf,1 constant, X
remains constant with respect to changes in Rf,0 or Rf,1 . Investors’ liquidation decision for
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k ∗ = k 0 given y = B is given by:

Rf,0 · Rf,1 · X < R · Rf,1
Rf,0 · X < R

This establishes that as Rf,0 decreases, investors’ liquidation condition is more likely to
bind.

Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. I show that for any borrowing constraint k̄, any nontrivial equilibrium as defined
in Proposition 2 exhibits inefficient investment by the low type. First, suppose that there
exists a (K1 , K2 ) equilibrium where K2 < k̄. Then the borrowing constraint does not bind.
As such, trivially, the low type makes inefficient investments in equilibrium. Next, suppose
that k̄ is sufficiently low such that k̄ is less than the minimum K2 in the set of (K1 , K2 )
equilibria. This implies that the borrowing constraint rules out the existence of a (K1 , K2 )
equilibrium. The remaining set of potential nontrivial equilibria is the set of uninformative
(pooling) equilibria, in which all types of the intermediary choose some capital investment
k ∗ . Formally, let a pooling equilibrium be characterized by k ∗ (θ) = k ∗ for θ ∈ {H, M, L}
and where investors’ beliefs are such that:







H











 M

θ= 






L








L

w.p. πH
w.p. πM

if k = k ∗

w.p. πL
otherwise.

where k ∗ such that Condition 1 is satisfied. It is easily verifiable that incentive conditions of
all types hold given investors beliefs, and in equilibrium all types choose capital investment
k∗ .
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Note, when (πH + πM + πL α)R ≥ 1, Condition 1 is satisfied for any k ∗ ≤ KM . Hence, when
(πH +πM +πL α)R ≥ 1, there exists a pooling equilibrium with equilibrium production k ∗ ≤
KM . Note that in any pooling equilibrium, the low type produces k ∗ > 0 bad assets. Since
for any k̄ a pooling equilibrium exists, this establishes that when (πH + πM + πL α)R ≥ 1,
a low type always overinvests in equilibrium.

Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. I show that there exists a threshold ē, such that for any e > ē, an equilibrium with
separation exists for any γ ∈ (0, 1) and any set of πθ . Let ē = αK(R − 1), and suppose that
e = ē. I conjecture and verify that a separating equilibrium exists in which k ∗ (θ) = Kθ and
investors beliefs are such that:

θ=





H




M





L

if k ∗ = KH
if k ∗ = KM
otherwise.

Given these beliefs, r(k) is given by:

r(k) =




1

if k ∗ ∈ {KH , KM }



∞

otherwise.

Note that for any k ∗ ∈
/ {KH , KM }, r(k) = ∞, and as such profits are 0. Hence, it suffices to
show that the intermediary does not have incentive to deviate to a disequilibrium strategy
given investors’ beliefs, particularly to either KH if the moderate type, KM if the high type,
and either KH or KM if the low type.First consider the high type intermediary. The high
type intermediary that chooses k ∗ = KH can obtain profits:

K(R − 1) > γK(R − 1)
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Since profits are (globally) maximized at k ∗ = KH , a high type intermediary’s incentive
compatibility condition holds. Next, consider a moderate type intermediary. The moderate
type’s incentive compatibility holds if:

γK(R − 1) + e > αK(R − 1) + (1 − α) max{γKR + e − K, 0}
γK(R − 1) > (1 − α) max{γKR + αK(R − 1) − K, 0}

If γKR + αK(R − 1) − K < 0, incentive compatibility holds. Suppose that γKR + αK(R −
1) − K > 0, which implies that γ >

1−α(R−1)
.
R

Then,

γK(R − 1) > (1 − α) (γKR + αK(R − 1) − K)
γ(αR − 1) > (1 − α)(αR − 1 − α)
αR − 1 − α
 αR − 1

α
= (1 − α) 1 +
1 − αR
2
α − α − α + α2 R
=1+
1 − αR
α2 (R − 1)
=1+
1 − αR

γ < (1 − α)

Since

α2 (R−1)
1−αR

> 0, incentive compatibility holds for any γ ∈ (0, 1). Finally, consider the

low type’s incentive compatibility condition:

e > αγK(R − 1) + (1 − α) max{e − γK, 0}

for γ ∈ (0, 1]. Expanding the expression for e:

αK(R − 1) > αγK(R − 1) + (1 − α) max{αK(R − 1) − γK, 0}
α(1 − γ)K(R − 1) > (1 − α) max{αK(R − 1) − γK, 0}

78

As before, if αK(R−1) ≤ γK, then the inequality holds, since the RHS becomes 0. Consider
the case in which αK(R − 1) > γK, which implies that γ < α(R − 1). Then:

α(1 − γ)K(R − 1) > (1 − α)(αK(R − 1) − γK)
γK − αγK(R − 1) > −αK(R − 1) + (1 − α)αK(R − 1)
γK(1 − αR + α) > −α2 K(R − 1)
γ>−

α2 (R − 1)
1 − αR + α

2

α (R−1)
Since − 1−αR+α
> 0, the low type’s incentive compatibility condition holds for any γ ∈ (0, 1].

This verifies that for e ≥ ē, a separating equilibrium exists.
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